Who is making money in digital health now?
In our digital health market deck, you will find everything you need to understand the market
SUMMARY
The companies making money in digital health now are mostly Doximity, Veeva, HealthEquity, Hinge Health and Oscar Health, with a second tier of thinner but real profits at Progyny, LifeStance, Phreesia, GoodRx and Privia Health.
Profitability has become the sector’s real dividing line. Funding has recovered, but almost half of the money is flowing into a tiny group of heavily financed companies, while public-market results now expose which business models actually work.
The headline count looks encouraging: ten of the 16 representative public companies reviewed reported a GAAP profit. Four of those ten, however, had net margins below 4%, so a difficult quarter could erase much of the progress.
The strongest economics come from the least glamorous parts of healthcare. Regulated software, physician networks, health accounts and employer benefits produce better margins than broad virtual care because customers depend on them and switching is painful.
Doximity and Veeva stand apart on profit quality. Both pair net margins near 30% with embedded distribution, recurring use and low incremental delivery costs; Doximity also converts an unusually large share of revenue into free cash flow.
Hinge Health provides the clearest evidence that digital treatment itself can become highly profitable. Its model works because the condition is narrow, the care pathway is repeatable, employers provide distribution and technology keeps delivery costs from rising as quickly as revenue.
Consumer digital health remains much less settled. Hims & Hers generates real cash and GoodRx reports strong adjusted EBITDA, but their latest combined GAAP result was still negative, and both remain exposed to marketing, pharmacy, regulatory and retention costs.
Benefits and insurance contain some of the sector’s largest profit pools. Oscar produced the biggest profit dollars in the group, while HealthEquity and Progyny earn from recurring financial and benefit relationships; the trade-off is greater exposure to claims, rates, utilization and regulation.
Healthcare AI is already profitable inside established platforms, not yet as a category on its own. Doximity and Veeva can place AI inside workflows and audiences they already control, while Tempus AI still shows how far rapid revenue growth can sit from GAAP profit.
The durable winners control something scarce and expensive to replace: a physician audience, a regulated workflow, a healthcare account, an employer benefit, an insurance relationship or a focused treatment pathway. A video visit, a consumer app or an AI label alone no longer creates much economic power.
This market map, featured in our digital health market deck, highlights top companies and startups in the digital health market
Why has digital-health profitability become the real story?
Digital-health profitability is now the dividing line between a broad field of interesting companies and a much smaller group of proven businesses.
Funding has recovered, but the recovery is highly concentrated. According to Rock Health, U.S. digital-health startups raised $7.4 billion across 244 deals during the first half of 2026. Twenty mega-deals captured 45% of that money. Barely 8% of funded companies therefore received almost half the capital.
The same pattern appeared across the previous full year. Funding rose 35% to $14.2 billion, yet nine heavily financed companies accounted for so much of the increase that, without them, total investment would have declined. AI-enabled companies collected 54% of all funding.
Investors are clearly still willing to finance digital health. They are simply placing much larger bets on fewer companies.
At the same time, a group of listed businesses has started producing meaningful net income. Doximity, Veeva, HealthEquity, Hinge Health and Oscar Health stand out. Progyny, LifeStance, Phreesia and Privia have also crossed into profit, though with less room for error.
Teladoc, Hims & Hers, Tempus AI, Amwell, Omada Health and Talkspace remained unprofitable under standard accounting in their latest reported periods. Several generate cash or adjusted EBITDA, but that is a lower bar.
The sector has reached a useful stage. We can finally compare business models through their actual economics rather than judging them mainly through funding rounds, user growth or ambitious market-size claims.
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest digital health market report.
What does “making money in digital health” mean?
For this article, making money means producing GAAP net income or dependable free cash flow, rather than simply reporting revenue growth or adjusted EBITDA.
The distinction sounds technical, but it changes the ranking completely.
Adjusted EBITDA removes costs such as stock compensation, restructuring charges, acquisition expenses, depreciation and, in some cases, legal costs. Some exclusions are genuinely temporary. Others appear so regularly that ignoring them gives an overly generous view of the business.
Hims & Hers is a good example. Its latest quarter produced $44 million of adjusted EBITDA and $53 million of free cash flow. The company still recorded a $92 million net loss after restructuring, acquisitions, stock compensation, legal expenses and financial-liability adjustments.
Teladoc also expects positive annual free cash flow and continues to report positive adjusted EBITDA. It remains loss-making under GAAP. GoodRx produced an adjusted EBITDA margin near 30%, while its net margin stayed below 1%.
We therefore give the most weight to GAAP profit. Sustained free cash flow comes next, especially when the accounting loss is driven mainly by non-cash expenses. Adjusted EBITDA tells us whether a company is getting closer, but it cannot settle the question on its own.
Our definition of digital health is practical. We include virtual care, digital clinical services, healthcare software, benefits platforms, digitally operated insurers and life-sciences technology. We leave out large pharmaceutical and technology groups when their digital-health results cannot be separated from the rest of the company.
As this chart shows, and as featured in our digital health market deck, search interest in longevity apps and related topics has been increasing
How many public digital-health companies are profitable now?
Ten of the 16 representative public digital-health companies we reviewed reported a GAAP profit in their latest period, although four earned net margins below 4%.
That is a stronger result than the sector’s reputation might suggest. The details are less flattering.
Doximity, Veeva, HealthEquity, Hinge Health and Oscar generated substantial earnings. The next group, including Progyny, LifeStance, Phreesia, GoodRx and Privia, produced much thinner profits. A modest change in reimbursement, customer retention, medical costs or operating expenses could push several of them back into losses.
The six unprofitable companies also sit at very different points. Omada was close to break-even. Talkspace’s loss was heavily affected by acquisition-related expenses. Hims and Teladoc generated free cash flow. Tempus expects positive adjusted EBITDA for the full year.
Still, shareholders ultimately bear the expenses removed from adjusted figures. We count a company as profitable only when the full income statement says so.
| Company | Main business | Latest-period revenue | GAAP net margin |
|---|---|---|---|
| Doximity | Physician network and workflow | $645M fiscal year | 30.4% |
| Veeva | Life-sciences cloud software | $3.20B fiscal year | 28.4% |
| HealthEquity | Health accounts and benefits | $355M quarter | 19.6% |
| Hinge Health | Digital musculoskeletal care | $182M quarter | 19.3% |
| Oscar Health | Digital-native health insurance | $4.65B quarter | 14.6% |
| Progyny | Fertility and family benefits | $329M quarter | 7.4% |
| LifeStance | Hybrid mental healthcare | $404M quarter | 3.5% |
| Phreesia | Patient intake and workflow | $131M quarter | 2.3% |
| GoodRx | Prescription access platform | $194M quarter | 0.6% |
| Privia Health | Physician enablement platform | $604M quarter | 0.5% |
| Omada Health | Virtual chronic-condition care | $78M quarter | -3.8% |
| Talkspace | Virtual mental healthcare | $62M quarter | -10.2% |
| Teladoc Health | Broad virtual care | $614M quarter | -10.4% |
| Hims & Hers | Consumer health platform | $608M quarter | -15.1% |
| Amwell | Enterprise telehealth infrastructure | $55M quarter | -18.8% |
| Tempus AI | Diagnostics and clinical data | $348M quarter | -36.2% |
Who are the biggest digital-health profit winners today?
Veeva, Oscar Health, Doximity, HealthEquity and Hinge Health currently produce the most convincing profits, though each earns them in a different way.
Veeva generated around $909 million of annual net income from $3.2 billion of revenue. Its business is straightforward: pharmaceutical and life-sciences companies pay for cloud software used in clinical trials, regulatory work, quality management and commercial operations. Those customers tend to stay for years because changing systems is expensive and disruptive.
Oscar reported approximately $679 million of net income in its latest quarter, the largest quarterly figure in our group. Insurance accounting requires care, however. Claims arrive unevenly, reserve estimates change, and results can benefit from prior-period adjustments. Oscar’s quarter included $68 million of favorable prior-period development.
Doximity earned about $196 million over its latest fiscal year and produced $318 million of free cash flow from only $645 million of revenue. No other company in our sample combined margins and cash conversion so effectively.
HealthEquity earned $69 million on quarterly revenue of $355 million. Much of its strength comes from health savings accounts and the $37.1 billion held inside them. Hinge earned $35 million on revenue of $182 million while still growing close to 50%.
The ranking depends on what we care about. Oscar currently produces the largest profit dollars. Veeva owns the largest established software profit engine. Doximity delivers the cleanest mix of margin, growth and cash. Hinge offers the strongest evidence that digitally delivered treatment itself can become highly profitable.
This chart, featured in our digital health market deck, shows annual VC investment in digital health startups
Why are the most profitable digital-health businesses so boring?
The most profitable digital-health companies usually control routine workflows, professional networks or healthcare money rather than chasing consumers with another app.
Veeva sells tools that pharmaceutical companies need to run regulated operations. Around 84% of its latest annual revenue came from subscriptions. Once a customer has moved clinical, regulatory and quality processes onto the system, switching creates years of work and operational risk.
Doximity reaches more than 85% of U.S. physicians. Pharmaceutical companies, hospitals and recruiters pay for access to that audience, while doctors use the network’s communication, scheduling and information tools. The company benefits each time the network becomes more useful, without employing the clinicians or paying for their medical work.
HealthEquity occupies an equally valuable position. It administers health savings accounts and related benefits. In its latest quarter, custodial revenue reached $174 million, ahead of service revenue at $123 million and interchange revenue at $57 million. The company earns from account administration, transactions and the assets held in those accounts.
These businesses scale well. Adding another software customer, physician or account holder costs much less than the revenue that customer can eventually generate.
Care-delivery businesses face a harder equation. More patients often require more clinicians, more prescriptions, more support staff or more advertising. Growth can remain expensive even after revenue reaches hundreds of millions of dollars.
Digital health becomes highly profitable when technology increases the value of an existing network or workflow. Simply delivering more healthcare through a screen rarely produces the same economics.
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest digital health market report.
Is Doximity the cleanest digital-health business right now?
Doximity is currently the cleanest listed digital-health business because it combines solid growth, a 30% net margin and unusually strong cash generation.
Revenue grew 13% to approximately $645 million in its latest fiscal year. Net income reached $196 million. Free cash flow increased 19% to $318 million, giving the company a free-cash-flow margin close to 49%.
For every $100 of revenue, Doximity kept almost $49 as free cash flow after operating expenses and capital spending. Most digital-health companies keep only a small fraction, even when they report adjusted profits.
The physician network gives Doximity an advantage that a newer software company would struggle to reproduce. More than 800,000 prescribers were active during the latest quarter. Nearly half used its clinical AI products.
That AI adoption is valuable because Doximity already owns the distribution. It can place new tools in front of hundreds of thousands of clinicians without building a customer base from scratch. The tools may increase engagement, support higher advertising prices and make the network harder to leave.
Pharmaceutical marketing budgets remain an important source of revenue, creating some concentration risk. Even so, the current results are unusually strong. Growth, accounting profit and cash flow are all moving in the same direction.
This chart, featured in our digital health market deck, shows how Hinge Health captured share in digital health
How did Hinge Health make digital care profitable?
Hinge Health made digital care profitable by focusing on one expensive clinical problem and designing most of the treatment around repeatable software-supported routines.
Musculoskeletal care suits this approach. Many patients follow structured programs based on exercise therapy, coaching, monitoring and gradual escalation. Hinge can automate parts of that pathway while reserving clinicians for cases that need more attention.
Revenue rose 47% to $182 million in the latest quarter. Gross margin improved from 81% to 85%. Operating income reached $32 million, net income reached $35 million and free cash flow reached $42 million.
The company’s client base grew 23% to 2,849, while trailing calculated billings increased 52% to about $770 million. Revenue grew much faster than the cost of delivering the service.
Employer distribution helps enormously. Hinge signs contracts covering large employee populations, so it does not need to acquire every patient separately through consumer advertising. Once an employer or health plan adds the service as a benefit, thousands of eligible people become reachable at once.
The product also gives buyers a clear reason to pay. Back pain and other musculoskeletal conditions create large medical costs, disability claims and lost working days. Hinge can present itself as a way to reduce those expenses rather than as an optional wellness product.
Its current performance suggests a real path for digital care: choose a narrow condition, standardize the treatment, sell to a payer and use technology to keep clinical costs from rising as quickly as revenue.
Are specialty-care platforms finally making money?
Specialty-care platforms are starting to make real money, especially when employers or insurers pay for a clearly defined treatment pathway.
Hinge, Progyny and LifeStance all reported positive net income. Omada came close to break-even and produced positive adjusted EBITDA. Talkspace also reported positive adjusted EBITDA, though acquisition expenses pushed its GAAP result into a loss.
Across Hinge, Progyny, LifeStance, Omada and Talkspace, we calculate roughly $1.05 billion of combined latest-quarter revenue and $64 million of net income. That works out to an aggregate margin near 6%.
The group is still far less profitable than Doximity or Veeva, but it has moved beyond the period when digital care almost always meant years of heavy losses.
Reimbursement explains much of the improvement. Hinge sells through employers and health plans. Progyny administers fertility benefits. LifeStance bills insurers for clinical visits. Omada distributes through health plans and pharmacy benefit managers. Talkspace’s payor revenue rose 28%, while its much smaller consumer revenue fell 26%.
A 2024 study of 33 listed digital-health companies found a similar pattern over a longer period. Companies with billing codes when they went public were estimated to be 25.5 times more likely to achieve positive compound growth in market value. The sample was small, but the gap was striking.
Products still need to work for patients. Reimbursement only provides the payment route. Yet a reliable payer gives a useful product a far better chance of becoming a durable business.
| Company | Latest quarterly revenue | GAAP result | What is working |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hinge Health | $182M, up 47% | $35M profit | Standardized care sold through employers |
| Progyny | $329M | $24M profit | High-value fertility benefits with employer distribution |
| LifeStance | $404M, up 21% | $14M profit | Large clinician network funded through insurance |
| Omada Health | $78M, up 42% | $3M loss | Strong payer and PBM distribution, close to break-even |
| Talkspace | $62M, up 18% | $6M loss | Payor revenue growing while consumer revenue shrinks |
This chart, featured in our digital health market deck, shows annual funding in digital health startups
Is consumer digital health actually profitable?
Consumer digital health remains only selectively profitable because rapid growth still comes with heavy advertising, pharmacy and regulatory costs.
Hims & Hers and GoodRx generated about $802 million of combined revenue in their latest quarters. Their combined GAAP result was a loss of roughly $91 million. Hims accounted for almost all of it, while GoodRx earned only around $1 million.
Both businesses look healthier through adjusted EBITDA and cash flow. GoodRx reported an adjusted EBITDA margin near 30%. Hims generated $53 million of free cash flow. Still, neither currently matches the quality of earnings seen at Doximity, Veeva or Hinge.
GoodRx also shows how quickly a successful consumer product can lose momentum. Prescription-transaction revenue fell 24% to approximately $114 million. Subscription revenue grew 16%, and its pharmaceutical-manufacturer business jumped 82% to $52 million, but the overall net margin stayed below 1%.
Hims has built a much larger recurring relationship with consumers, yet it must keep paying for marketing, pharmacy operations, clinical support, acquisitions and new product launches. Weight-loss medicines added powerful demand and considerable regulatory complexity at the same time.
Private consumer-health companies regularly announce that they have reached profitability. Those claims are difficult to compare without audited accounts, consistent definitions or full cash-flow statements.
Consumer digital health can work when one treatment leads to a longer relationship covering several conditions. The evidence today remains mixed. Large audiences and strong brands have produced substantial revenue, but clean, dependable profits are still rare.
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest digital health market report.
Is Hims & Hers making money now?
Hims & Hers generates real cash today, although its latest accounts still show a large net loss.
The company served almost 2.6 million subscribers and generated $44 million of adjusted EBITDA, $89 million of operating cash flow and $53 million of free cash flow during the quarter.
Those figures show that the core operation can bring in more cash than it spends. The $92 million GAAP loss tells us that the full cost structure remains much heavier.
The reconciliation included around $37 million of stock compensation, $34 million of restructuring costs, $15 million tied to a legal settlement and $13 million of acquisition expenses. Some should fade. Stock compensation and deal costs may continue as long as the company keeps expanding aggressively.
Hims also faces a moving product environment. Weight-loss treatments helped drive demand, but changing rules around compounded GLP-1 medicines forced the company to adapt its offering. It is now broadening access to branded treatments while investing in more clinical categories.
The company has already proven that consumers will pay for convenient, discreet access to treatment. It has also built a large recurring subscriber base and meaningful cash generation.
What remains uncertain is the normal long-term margin after acquisitions, compensation, regulatory changes and new-market spending. Hims has a viable business. Its settled level of profitability is still taking shape.
This chart, featured in our digital health market deck, compares the main business model options for digital health SaaS platforms
Has digital mental health found a profitable model?
Digital mental health is becoming viable through insurance-funded care, while direct consumer subscriptions continue to struggle.
LifeStance generated $404 million of quarterly revenue, $14 million of net income and $51 million of adjusted EBITDA. It completed about 2.5 million visits with 8,349 clinicians.
The net margin was only 3.5%, but the company proved that a large mental-health network can earn money when clinician capacity, reimbursement and scheduling are managed carefully.
Talkspace points in the same direction. Total revenue rose 18%, with payor revenue up 28%. Consumer revenue fell 26% to just $3.5 million. The company produced $4.6 million of adjusted EBITDA and recorded a $6.3 million net loss, largely because of expenses related to its pending acquisition by Universal Health Services.
Universal Health Services agreed to buy Talkspace at an enterprise value of roughly $835 million. Talkspace had delivered more than 1.6 million sessions during the previous year and was available to over 200 million people through health plans and employer arrangements.
The buyer is acquiring a reimbursed national care network with digital access. The shrinking consumer subscription business plays a much smaller role.
BetterHelp shows the weakness of that consumer model. Its latest full-year revenue fell 9%, and segment adjusted EBITDA dropped 46%. Its most recent quarterly adjusted EBITDA margin was below 1%.
The model gaining ground is easy to see: broad insurance coverage, a large provider network and digital tools that make access easier. Consumer subscriptions still depend too heavily on advertising and monthly retention.
Why is broad telehealth still struggling to make money?
Broad telehealth still struggles because video access has become easy to offer, while running a large clinical platform remains expensive.
Teladoc generated $614 million of revenue in its latest quarter and lost around $64 million. Integrated Care revenue grew only 2%, while BetterHelp revenue fell 9%.
Across the previous full year, Teladoc generated $2.53 billion of revenue, lost about $200 million and produced $167 million of free cash flow. Adjusted EBITDA declined 10%.
The company already operates at enormous scale. That scale has helped it generate cash, but it has failed to restore strong growth or GAAP profitability. Each additional member brings some value, though the platform still carries clinical, technology, marketing and administrative costs.
Amwell faces an even tougher position. Quarterly revenue fell 18% to approximately $55 million, subscription revenue declined 23%, and the company lost around $10 million. Cash usage improved, but the business contracted while costs were being cut.
Broad telehealth also lacks the pricing power found in a specialized treatment program. A basic video consultation can be offered by health systems, insurers, pharmacies, physician groups and consumer platforms. The technology itself no longer provides much protection.
Hinge can show employers a focused musculoskeletal pathway. Progyny manages a complex fertility benefit. Doximity owns a physician network. Teladoc and Amwell offer much broader access, which makes their value harder to measure and easier to copy.
Virtual care remains useful. As a standalone business category, it has produced disappointing economics.
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest digital health market report.
This chart, featured in our digital health market deck, shows how revenue is split across customer segments in the digital health market
Are benefits and insurance the hidden digital-health profit pool?
Benefits and insurance have become a major digital-health profit pool because they control premiums, healthcare assets, employer budgets and payment flows.
Oscar provides the largest numbers. It reported quarterly revenue of approximately $4.65 billion and net income of $679 million. Membership rose from about 2.0 million to 3.2 million, while its medical-loss ratio improved from 75.4% to 70.5%.
The result should be read carefully. Insurance profits move with claim timing, reserve changes and risk-adjustment payments. Oscar also received $68 million of favorable prior-period development.
HealthEquity has more predictable economics. It administered 10.6 million health savings accounts containing $37.1 billion of assets. Account numbers increased 8%, while assets increased 19%. The company earned a 20% net margin and a 46% adjusted EBITDA margin in its latest quarter.
Progyny operates between benefits administration and clinical care. It served 595 clients, up from 532, and earned $24 million during the quarter. Its customers pay for help navigating fertility and family-building treatment, an expensive and complex area where employees value support.
These companies earn money because healthcare is also a financial system. Whoever controls the account, benefit, premium or payment process can collect recurring revenue around the care itself.
Their risks differ. Oscar carries medical claims. HealthEquity is partly exposed to interest rates because custodial yields affect revenue. Progyny depends on large employers and treatment utilization.
Even with those risks, benefits and financing currently offer some of the clearest profit pools in digital health.
Is healthcare AI making money yet?
Healthcare AI makes money today when it sits inside an established workflow, while most AI-first healthcare companies still fall short of GAAP profitability.
Tempus AI shows how wide that gap can be. Revenue rose 36% to approximately $348 million. Diagnostics produced $261 million, and data and applications revenue grew 41% to $87 million.
Adjusted EBITDA improved to a loss of only about $3 million. The GAAP net loss reached approximately $126 million.
That loss included $56 million of stock compensation and related payroll costs, along with $32 million of unrealized losses on marketable securities. Tempus expects positive adjusted EBITDA for the full year, but its current accounts still require investors to absorb substantial costs.
Doximity has a more favorable setup. It can introduce clinical AI to hundreds of thousands of physicians already using its network. Veeva can place AI inside pharmaceutical workflows that customers already depend on for regulated work.
Both companies avoid the hardest part of commercializing AI: finding distribution. Their customers already exist, the data already flows through the platform, and the new tools solve a task inside a familiar system.
Rock Health found that AI-enabled companies received 54% of digital-health funding in 2025. More recently, buyers have started treating AI as a standard product feature rather than a sufficient advantage on its own.
The profitable healthcare-AI companies are therefore likely to be established platforms using AI to deepen an existing relationship. AI-first businesses can still become large, but revenue growth alone has not yet established durable profits.
This chart, featured in our digital health market deck, shows how remote patient monitoring platform technology has evolved over time
Which digital-health profits are most durable?
The most durable digital-health profits currently come from deeply embedded workflows, professional networks and recurring financial relationships.
Veeva and Doximity lead on quality. Customers rely on their platforms for repeated, important work. Incremental delivery costs are low, margins are high and both companies convert a large share of earnings into cash.
HealthEquity and Progyny also occupy strong positions. Their services sit inside benefit systems that employers and account holders rarely replace casually. HealthEquity faces interest-rate exposure, while Progyny must manage client concentration and treatment demand.
Hinge is younger, but its results are becoming difficult to dismiss. Growth, gross margin, net income and free cash flow are all improving together. Its main test will be maintaining those economics as client numbers and care volumes rise.
Oscar’s profits are substantial and more volatile. Medical claims, reserve assumptions, enrolment and regulation can reshape results quickly.
GoodRx has a much thinner cushion. Its original prescription-transaction business is shrinking, while newer revenue sources are still replacing that pressure. Hims generates cash but remains exposed to marketing costs, regulatory shifts and changing treatment demand.
Teladoc and Amwell have yet to show that broad telehealth can return to profitable growth. Omada, Talkspace and Tempus are moving closer, although their adjusted results still run ahead of their GAAP earnings.
| Business model | Current evidence | Main weakness | Durability |
|---|---|---|---|
| Professional and life-sciences workflow | High margins and cash flow at Doximity and Veeva | Customer concentration and slower enterprise budgets | Very strong |
| Health accounts and specialty benefits | Profitable recurring relationships at HealthEquity and Progyny | Interest rates, utilization and large clients | Strong |
| Focused digital care | Rapid improvement at Hinge and modest profit at LifeStance | Employer renewals and clinical delivery costs | Promising |
| Digital-native insurance | Large profit at Oscar | Claims, reserves, regulation and seasonality | Real but volatile |
| Consumer health and pharmacy access | Cash generation at Hims, thin profit at GoodRx | Marketing, regulation and customer retention | Unsettled |
| Broad telehealth | Some cash generation at Teladoc | Weak growth and limited differentiation | Weak |
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest digital health market report.
Who is making money in digital health now?
Digital health is making real money now, and most of it flows to infrastructure owners, financial platforms and focused-care companies.
Doximity and Veeva have the strongest overall economics. They own professional networks and business workflows that customers repeatedly pay to use. Both produce net margins close to 30%.
HealthEquity earns substantial profits from health accounts, custodial assets and transaction flows. Progyny has built a smaller but profitable position in fertility benefits.
Hinge Health offers the clearest proof that digitally delivered treatment can produce excellent economics. It combined 47% growth with a 19% net margin and free-cash-flow generation above 20%.
Oscar currently generates the largest profit in absolute dollars, though insurance earnings carry more volatility than software subscriptions.
LifeStance, Phreesia, GoodRx and Privia are profitable with narrow margins. They have crossed the line, but they have little protection against a difficult quarter.
Hims, Teladoc and Talkspace generate cash or adjusted profit while remaining unprofitable under GAAP. Omada is close to break-even. Tempus is growing rapidly and still absorbing large accounting losses. Amwell continues to shrink while reducing spending.
The broader pattern is now hard to miss. Digital access has become common. Valuable positions remain scarce.
The companies making the most money control something difficult to replace: a physician audience, a regulated workflow, a healthcare account, an employer benefit, an insurance relationship or a narrowly defined treatment pathway.
A video visit alone no longer creates much economic power. Neither does attaching AI to a generic health product.
Today’s winners have placed technology inside a part of healthcare where someone already has a strong reason to pay and where changing providers would create real inconvenience, cost or risk.
In our digital health market deck, we identify pain points entrepreneurs should prioritize
OUR METHODOLOGY
This analysis identifies who is making money in digital health by comparing the latest reported economics of 16 representative public companies across healthcare software, virtual care, digital clinical services, benefits, insurance, consumer health and healthcare AI.
We used GAAP net income as the clearest test of profitability because it includes the full cost structure borne by shareholders. Sustained free cash flow was the next strongest measure. Adjusted EBITDA was used to judge operating progress, not to classify a company as profitable on its own.
We compared each company using its latest reported period. Annual figures are shown where the company’s most recent complete result was a fiscal year, while most other comparisons use the latest quarter. Margins, cash generation and growth were interpreted together rather than ranked from a single number.
Insurance results were read differently from software results. For Oscar Health, we looked beyond headline net income to claims, medical-loss ratios, reserve movements and prior-period development because those items can move quarterly earnings sharply.
We included companies only when digital health formed a clear, separable part of the business. Large pharmaceutical and technology groups were excluded when their digital-health revenue and profit could not be isolated. Private-company profitability claims were not used in the main ranking because they rarely come with audited accounts and consistent definitions.
We prioritized company filings, earnings releases and investor materials for revenue, net income, margins, cash flow, subscriber or client counts, medical-cost measures and segment performance. Rock Health’s funding research was used to place company results inside the wider financing market, and published reimbursement research was used to test whether payment structure affects long-term performance.
Key sources include Rock Health’s digital-health funding reports, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR database, investor-relations materials from Doximity, Veeva Systems, HealthEquity, Hinge Health, Oscar Health, Progyny, LifeStance, Phreesia, GoodRx, Privia Health, Omada Health, Talkspace, Teladoc Health, Hims & Hers, Amwell and Tempus AI, plus relevant studies indexed by the National Library of Medicine.
This chart, featured in our digital health market deck, shows how revenue is distributed by region across Europe, Asia, North America, Africa, and South America in the digital health market
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