Defense Tech: what is getting real adoption now?
In our defense tech market deck, you will find everything you need to understand the market
SUMMARY
Defense tech is getting real military adoption now, led by cheap drones, counter-drone systems, battlefield software, electronic warfare around unmanned systems and commercial space services.
The clearest dividing line is repeat use. Prototype contracts still attract headlines, but millions of drones, recurring replenishment, operational software users and procurement systems built around a technology show that militaries have actually absorbed it.
Cheap drones have gone furthest. Ukraine delivered more than three million FPVs in 2025, while the U.S. Army's new drone marketplace moved more than $750 million of products in less than six months. Small unmanned aircraft increasingly behave like consumable battlefield equipment rather than miniature aviation programs.
Counter-drone spending is scaling almost as quickly as drone procurement itself. Ukraine was receiving roughly 950 anti-Shahed interceptors per day by the end of 2025, the U.S. Army is buying Coyote interceptors in quantity, and NATO has announced more than $40 billion of planned counter-drone investment over five years.
The drone boom is also pulling electronic warfare, communications, sensors and navigation into the same market. The rapid spread of fiber-controlled FPVs in Ukraine shows how quickly procurement can shift when jamming changes what survives on the battlefield.
Battlefield AI looks most mature when it solves practical information problems. Maven's expanding Pentagon contract and DELTA's more than 200,000 Ukrainian defense users point toward AI being adopted first for intelligence, sensor fusion, targeting support and command-and-control rather than broad autonomous combat.
Commercial space has quietly become normal defense infrastructure. Long-term imagery contracts and the expansion of the U.S. military's proliferated-LEO services vehicle from a $900 million ceiling to $13 billion show governments increasingly buying commercial capacity as a permanent layer around sovereign systems.
Ground robots are also further along than their futuristic image suggests, largely because the useful jobs are mundane. More than 15,000 systems reached Ukrainian units in 2025, with logistics, evacuation and engineering providing stronger adoption evidence than autonomous ground combat.
Larger autonomous platforms are finally moving from experiments toward fleets. Australia's A$1.7 billion Ghost Shark program and live-fire progress in U.S. and Australian collaborative combat aircraft are serious commitments, although reliability, maintenance and routine squadron or fleet use still need to catch up with the procurement ambition.
Directed energy has crossed an important threshold too. A U.S. high-energy laser has now been used operationally against hostile drones and the Army has placed its first production order, moving lasers into a different category from the demonstration programs that dominated the previous two decades.
A less obvious change sits underneath all of this: procurement itself is becoming part of defense technology adoption. Ukraine, the U.S. Army, NATO and other military organizations are building marketplaces and faster purchasing routes that allow operational units to choose, replenish and replace rapidly evolving systems instead of waiting through traditional multi-year acquisition cycles.
The overall pattern is practical rather than futuristic. The technologies reshaping military budgets today are unmanned systems and the software, sensors, communications, electronic warfare and defenses that make them useful; fully autonomous swarms and general-purpose battlefield robots remain much further from broad adoption.
This market map, featured in our defense tech market deck, highlights top companies and startups in the defense tech market
What actually counts as real adoption in defense tech?
Real defense-tech adoption today means militaries are buying a technology repeatedly, putting it in operational units, using it on real missions, or changing the way they organize and procure around it.
That is a much higher bar than winning a prototype contract. Defense companies can spend years announcing trials, exercises and development programs without ever reaching meaningful production. We therefore care much more about quantities, repeat orders and actual use than about the size of an early-stage contract.
Ukraine gives us the clearest benchmark. Its Ministry of Defence says the country received more than three million FPV drones in 2025, compared with roughly 1.2 million the previous year. More than 15,000 ground robotic systems also reached military units. By the end of 2025, nearly 1,000 interceptor drones were being supplied to combat units every day.
A dozen prototypes can tell us that a technology works. Tens of thousands of systems, recurring orders or hundreds of millions of dollars moving through a procurement channel tell us that militaries actually want it.
| Where the technology sits now | What we are actually seeing |
|---|---|
| Mass adoption | Huge quantities, routine operational use and constant replacement |
| Strong adoption | Large procurement programs and regular use by military units |
| Early adoption | Production orders exist, though operational fleets remain small |
| Pre-scale | Serious testing and funding, with limited repeat deployment |
| Experimental | Mostly prototypes, demonstrations or development programs |
Are cheap military drones now standard equipment?
Cheap military drones are already standard battlefield equipment, and the strongest evidence now goes far beyond Ukraine.
Ukraine remains the extreme case because the quantities are enormous. The country's Ministry of Defence reported more than three million FPV drones delivered in 2025, roughly 2.5 times the previous year's volume. The same ministry said Ukraine had built annual domestic drone-production capacity approaching 20 million units.
The procurement system has changed along with the quantities. Through DOT-Chain Defence, combat units can directly choose systems from competing manufacturers instead of waiting for one centrally selected drone. In late 2025, more than 100,000 FPVs had already moved through the platform in less than four months. Units could choose among more than 180 FPV models from 40 manufacturers, and average delivery time had fallen to around seven days.
That looks much closer to replenishing ammunition than procuring a traditional aircraft.
The stronger surprise is what has happened outside Ukraine. The U.S. Army launched its own UAS Marketplace in March 2026. Less than six months later, the Army said more than $750 million of drones had already been sold through it. The marketplace has since expanded from smaller aircraft into larger Group 3 drones, payloads, components and software.
NATO has moved in the same direction. At its 2026 Defence Industry Forum, Allies announced more than $40 billion of planned investment in counter-drone capabilities over five years, a large surveillance-drone procurement and a goal of training five times as many drone operators by the end of 2027.
Small drones have crossed the adoption line decisively.
| Evidence | Scale | What it shows |
|---|---|---|
| Ukrainian FPV deliveries in 2025 | >3 million | Drones have become consumable battlefield equipment |
| DOT-Chain FPVs delivered in under four months | >100,000 | Units are choosing and replenishing systems directly |
| U.S. Army UAS Marketplace sales since launch | >$750m | Western procurement is moving beyond small pilot programs |
| NATO counter-drone investment announced | >$40bn over five years | Unmanned warfare is moving into alliance-level spending plans |
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest defense tech market report.
As this chart shows, and as featured in our defense tech market deck, search interest in defense tech has risen sharply
Are loitering munitions becoming normal weapons too?
Loitering munitions are becoming a normal layer of military firepower, especially where armies want something cheaper and more flexible than a traditional precision missile.
Poland gives us a useful European example. Its defence ministry signed a framework agreement covering roughly 10,000 Warmate loitering munitions and close to 1,000 system sets. Orders of that size belong in a standing arsenal, rather than an innovation portfolio.
The U.S. has also pushed AeroVironment's Switchblade 600 through its Replicator initiative, which was created specifically to put large numbers of attritable autonomous systems into service quickly. Europe is building a common procurement route as well: 18 countries have joined the European Defence Agency's loitering-munitions effort.
Ukraine shows why militaries want the category. A loitering munition can stay airborne while a target develops, then attack when the operator finds the right opportunity. That creates a useful middle layer between an FPV drone, artillery fire and a more expensive missile.
The quantities are now large enough to separate the category from traditional precision weapons. Militaries can buy loitering munitions in thousands, making frequent battlefield use economically realistic.
Are interceptor drones and counter-drone systems becoming a real air-defense layer?
Interceptor drones and counter-drone systems are already becoming a serious air-defense layer because cheap drones have broken the economics of traditional air defense.
Ukraine's Defence Procurement Agency said deliveries of anti-Shahed interceptor drones approached 950 units per day in December 2025. More than ten manufacturers were already supplying the category, and the government had started contracting 2026 requirements before the year began.
The economics explain the urgency. Shahed-type attack drones force defenders to choose between letting an incoming weapon through or using scarce air-defense ammunition. A cheaper unmanned interceptor gives commanders another option and helps preserve expensive missiles for cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and higher-value targets.
Ukraine has also put tactical interceptor drones into DOT-Chain Defence so brigades can directly order systems designed to hunt reconnaissance aircraft such as Orlan and Zala drones. The United Kingdom has already agreed to manufacture a Ukrainian-designed interceptor, beginning with an initial batch of 1,000 units for Ukraine.
The U.S. Army is spending heavily on the same problem. One rapid acquisition covered 600 Coyote 2C interceptors for $75 million, followed by another award worth nearly $197 million.
Joint Interagency Task Force 401 has created a counter-UAS marketplace for military units, law-enforcement agencies and allied countries, while NATO's latest Drone Edge initiative calls for more than $40 billion of counter-drone investment over five years.
Militaries are also buying layers rather than searching for one miracle weapon. NATO's latest counter-drone testing involved more than 60 commercial systems and 40 software applications from 40 companies. Radar, radio-frequency detection, electro-optical sensors, jammers, interceptor drones, guns, missiles and directed energy all solve different parts of the problem.
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest defense tech market report.
This chart, included in our defense tech market deck, shows annual VC investment in defense tech startups
Has electronic warfare become part of the drone market?
Electronic warfare has effectively become part of the drone market because every improvement in unmanned systems now triggers another fight over communications, navigation and spectrum.
Ukraine offers a simple example. As radio jamming became more effective against standard FPVs, fiber-optic drones spread quickly. By late 2025, nearly one-third of the first 100,000 FPVs delivered through DOT-Chain Defence were fiber-controlled.
Fiber control removes the usual radio link from the equation, which makes conventional jamming far less useful. The trade-off comes in weight, maneuverability and the physical cable trailing behind the aircraft. Battlefield demand was still strong enough for dozens of manufacturers to move into the category.
The cycle continues from there. Militaries need better radio-frequency detection, resilient links, alternative navigation and more autonomy when GPS or communications disappear.
Ukraine's procurement system already reflects that broader market. DOT-Chain Defence has expanded beyond aircraft into electronic-warfare equipment, ground systems and related components. NATO's work with Ukraine now includes secure communications, SIGINT and navigation in contested electromagnetic environments.
A drone that performs perfectly on a quiet test range can become almost useless once heavy jamming starts.
Is battlefield AI and defense software actually being used for real?
Battlefield AI and defense software are already in real military use, especially for intelligence, sensor fusion, targeting support and command-and-control.
Palantir's Maven Smart System has moved well beyond a small AI experiment. The Pentagon initially awarded a $480 million production contract in 2024. In 2025, growing demand from combatant commands led to another $795 million being added to the contract ceiling, taking the total potential value to around $1.3 billion.
The financial trajectory reinforces what the contracts show. Palantir reported government revenue of $1.22 billion in 2023, $1.57 billion in 2024 and $2.40 billion in 2025. U.S. government revenue alone reached about $1.9 billion that year.
Maven is only one part of that business, so we should not assign all the growth to one platform. The wider pattern is still hard to miss: military and government buyers are spending heavily on software that brings data, imagery and AI together.
Ukraine gives us a second kind of evidence. NATO Allied Command Transformation said in June 2026 that DELTA, Ukraine's digital command-and-control ecosystem, was already used by more than 200,000 members of the Defence Forces. NATO-developed AI is now being integrated into that environment.
The strongest products solve an integration problem. Maven turns scattered battlefield information into something commanders can act on. DELTA gives Ukrainian forces a shared operational picture. NATO is building similar ideas into its Enhanced Air Command and Control program and new targeting systems.
That explains why open architecture is becoming important. One military may operate drones from several manufacturers, multiple radar families, different electronic-warfare tools and a mix of old and new weapons. Software that connects those systems can become valuable across the whole force.
The use cases are much more practical than fully autonomous combat. AI helps people process imagery, find objects, combine sensor feeds and make decisions faster.
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest defense tech market report.
This chart, included in our defense tech market deck, shows why Anduril is winning in defense tech
Is commercial space already normal military infrastructure?
Commercial space is already normal military infrastructure in communications and imagery, and governments are now expanding that model into radar, tracking and other services.
The National Reconnaissance Office provided one early proof point when it awarded its largest commercial imagery procurement to BlackSky, Maxar and Planet. The EOCL contracts were valued at billions of dollars over a decade.
Space Systems Command has since pushed the model much further. Its Proliferated Low Earth Orbit services contract began with a $900 million ceiling and 16 vendors. The ceiling later expanded to $13 billion and the vendor pool grew to 20 companies.
The services available under that vehicle go well beyond broadband. They can include synthetic-aperture radar imagery, space-domain awareness and alternative positioning, navigation and timing.
Europe is following. Germany backed a €240 million multi-year Planet agreement covering dedicated satellite capacity, direct downlink, optical imagery and AI-enabled situational awareness. NATO also uses commercial imagery for persistent surveillance and indications and warning.
Commercial capacity is now being built around government-owned systems as a permanent part of military space architecture.
Are military ground robots finally useful?
Military ground robots are genuinely useful today, and the adoption is coming first from boring jobs that soldiers would rather not do under fire.
Ukraine delivered more than 15,000 ground robotic systems to military units in 2025, according to its Ministry of Defence. That is several times the previous year's volume.
The missions explain the demand. Ukrainian forces use ground robots for logistics, casualty evacuation, reconnaissance, mine-laying, mine clearance and patrol. Some carry weapon stations, although support tasks appear further along in routine use.
Moving ammunition through an area covered by enemy drones is an ideal robotic mission. The robot needs enough mobility, range and reliability to keep a soldier away from a dangerous route.
Ukraine has also added ground robots to DOT-Chain Defence, letting military units directly choose among competing models. Earlier in 2026, its Defence Procurement Agency said the previous year's requested quantities had been fully met and deliveries actually exceeded the armed forces' planned requirement.
Armed ground robots are further behind. Ukraine is already experimenting with remotely operated weapon stations and strike configurations, but the strongest evidence today is still in transport, evacuation and engineering work.
| Ground-robot job | Where adoption stands |
|---|---|
| Ammunition and supply transport | Already being used at meaningful scale |
| Casualty evacuation | Real frontline use |
| Mine and engineering work | Operational use, still growing |
| Reconnaissance and patrol | Operational but less clearly quantified |
| Armed remote combat | Early field use and testing |
| Fully autonomous ground combat | Still far from broad adoption |
This chart, included in our defense tech market deck, shows annual funding in defense tech startups
Are large autonomous military platforms actually entering fleets?
Large autonomous military platforms are now entering serious fleet programs at sea and in the air, although routine operational use still trails far behind small drones.
Australia's Ghost Shark gives us the clearest maritime example. Australia moved from co-development with Anduril to a A$1.7 billion five-year contract covering delivery, maintenance and continued development of the extra-large autonomous undersea vehicle. The government says the Royal Australian Navy will receive dozens of them.
Three prototypes had already been delivered on budget and ahead of schedule before the production decision. From initial joint development to a program of record took roughly three years.
Ghost Shark is designed for long-range intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and strike missions alongside Australia's crewed fleet and future nuclear-powered submarines. The U.S. Navy is also developing unmanned surface and underwater systems, with autonomous vessels already appearing in exercises and multinational deployments.
The air side is moving quickly too. The U.S. Air Force's first Collaborative Combat Aircraft prototypes reached flight testing less than two years after the program started. A YFQ-44A then fired an AIM-120 against a digital target in July 2026.
Soon afterward, Air Force crews at Creech Air Force Base were testing CCA deployment, logistics, weapons loading and operations from a more realistic expeditionary environment. The Netherlands has formally joined the U.S. effort and plans to acquire prototypes.
Australia's MQ-28 Ghost Bat is moving in parallel. The government committed about A$1.4 billion to move the aircraft toward operational service and fund additional systems. A Ghost Bat has already fired an AIM-120 and destroyed an airborne target while operating alongside an E-7A Wedgetail and an F/A-18F Super Hornet.
These programs have gone well beyond concept demonstrations. The remaining question is scale. Large autonomous platforms still have to prove maintenance, reliability, communications under electronic attack and everyday operator workload before dozens of prototypes become hundreds of routinely used aircraft and vessels.
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest defense tech market report.
Have military lasers finally become real weapons?
Military lasers have just crossed one of the clearest adoption thresholds in their history: a U.S. high-energy laser has been used against hostile drones, and the Army has now placed its first production order.
In late August, U.S. personnel supporting operations along the southern border used the Army Multipurpose High Energy Laser to engage and defeat three unmanned aircraft that U.S. Northern Command classified as hostile.
Soon afterward, the U.S. Army awarded AeroVironment the service's first production contract for a high-energy laser weapon system. The Enduring-High Energy Laser program is intended to move the technology from prototype status into repeat production. The contract is worth roughly $465 million and can support production of dozens of systems over several years.
The economic argument remains compelling. Once a laser is powered and functioning, each additional shot can be extremely cheap compared with firing a missile.
Real operations will now test the harder questions: uptime, power requirements, maintenance, tracking performance, atmospheric conditions and how well the system works after months in the field.
High-power microwave weapons sit one step behind. Epirus previously received a $43.6 million Army contract for two next-generation systems after delivering an earlier batch. Their appeal is particularly strong against swarms because one electromagnetic effect could potentially disrupt several electronic targets.
This chart, included in our defense tech market deck, compares the main business model options for defense AI contractors
Are defense startups actually winning serious military contracts?
Defense startups and newer technology companies are winning serious production business today, with some moving into positions that used to belong almost entirely to traditional primes.
Anduril's Ghost Shark contract is one of the clearest examples. A company founded in 2017 is now responsible for a A$1.7 billion autonomous undersea program for the Royal Australian Navy.
Palantir provides the software version. Its government business reached $2.4 billion in 2025, and the U.S. Army has created an enterprise agreement worth up to $10 billion over ten years covering software and data capabilities.
AeroVironment has become important across drones, loitering munitions and counter-drone systems, and it has now won the Army's first production high-energy-laser award.
The shift becomes more visible when we look at procurement structures rather than individual companies. The U.S. Army's drone marketplace has already handled more than $750 million of sales. Space Systems Command's $13 billion pLEO vehicle deliberately keeps 20 commercial providers available. NATO has created or announced marketplaces for drone and counter-drone procurement.
The big defense companies are still doing extremely well. RTX supplies Coyote interceptors. Northrop Grumman remains central to large autonomous aircraft and space programs. Boeing, Lockheed Martin, L3Harris and other primes continue to win enormous contracts in missiles, satellites, aircraft and conventional platforms.
The interesting change is who can become the prime contractor. A younger company can now own the complete software layer, autonomous undersea platform or unmanned-aircraft system instead of supplying one component to a legacy prime.
What defense tech still looks ahead of its actual adoption?
Fully autonomous combat swarms, general-purpose battlefield robots and broad claims about autonomous warfare still sit well ahead of what militaries are actually using at scale.
The contrast with drones makes the gap obvious. We can count millions of Ukrainian FPVs, nearly 1,000 interceptor drones delivered per day at the end of 2025, more than $750 million passing through the U.S. Army's drone marketplace and tens of billions of dollars now planned for counter-drone capabilities.
Comparable evidence does not exist for autonomous swarms conducting large combat missions with minimal human control.
The same distinction applies to AI. Maven and DELTA show that AI-supported command, intelligence and targeting workflows are real. Broad delegation of lethal decision-making to autonomous systems remains much further behind.
Ground robotics tells a similar story. Ukraine has bought more than 15,000 ground robotic systems and uses them across logistics, evacuation and engineering. That gives us strong evidence for practical unmanned vehicles, with much less proof for autonomous robotic combat.
CCAs are closer. Aircraft are flying, weapons have been fired and serious production money exists. Routine squadron use still needs to be demonstrated.
Lasers have also only just made the move into production. The recent operational engagement and first Army production contract make the category much more credible today, but field reliability will determine how quickly it scales.
This chart, featured in our defense tech market deck, shows the share of revenue generated by each customer segment in the defense tech market
So what defense tech is actually getting real adoption now?
Defense tech is getting real adoption today in five areas above all: cheap drones, counter-drone systems, battlefield software, electronic warfare around unmanned systems and commercial space services.
Small drones sit clearly at the top. Ukraine's three-million-plus FPV deliveries in 2025 already put the category at ammunition-like scale. The U.S. Army then created a marketplace that moved more than $750 million of drone products in less than six months. NATO is now building drone training and procurement around the same reality.
Counter-drone technology follows immediately because those millions of aircraft need to be stopped. Interceptor drones, Coyote-type systems, jammers, sensors and now lasers are all getting real money. NATO's planned investment above $40 billion makes this much larger than a Ukrainian wartime phenomenon.
Battlefield software is quieter but just as real. Palantir's government revenue nearly doubled between 2023 and 2025, Maven's contract ceiling grew to around $1.3 billion, and DELTA already serves more than 200,000 Ukrainian defense personnel.
Commercial space has already become infrastructure. Billion-dollar imagery programs and the expansion of the U.S. pLEO services ceiling from $900 million to $13 billion show how far governments have moved toward buying commercial capacity as a normal part of military space architecture.
Ground robots and large autonomous platforms form the next group. Ukraine's more than 15,000 ground systems give us real scale in logistics and support missions. Australia's A$1.7 billion Ghost Shark contract and the rapid progress of U.S. and Australian collaborative combat aircraft show where larger autonomy is starting to move into production.
Directed energy now sits just behind them. The U.S. Army has finally moved a high-energy laser into production after using a laser operationally against hostile drones.
Procurement is adapting around all of this. Ukraine built DOT-Chain Defence. The U.S. Army built its drone marketplace. The wider U.S. military is bringing air, land, maritime and counter-drone products into common procurement channels. NATO is building its own purchasing routes.
As of now, the center of real defense-tech adoption is clear: unmanned systems and the software, sensors, communications, electronic warfare and defenses that make those systems useful. The futuristic platforms are starting to arrive, but the technologies already reshaping military budgets are much more practical — and they are being bought in quantity.
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest defense tech market report.
OUR METHODOLOGY
This analysis asks which defense technologies are actually getting real military adoption now. We broke the question into several dimensions and looked for recent evidence of procurement scale, repeat purchasing, production commitments, systems reaching operational units, documented mission use, user adoption and changes in the way militaries organize or procure around a technology.
We gave more weight to sustained behavior than to isolated announcements. Prototype contracts, demonstrations and exercises can show that a military is interested in a technology, but recurring orders, rising delivery volumes, systems deployed with real units, dedicated purchasing channels and technologies becoming part of normal military workflows provide much stronger evidence of adoption.
The evidence also changes by category. Unit volumes and replacement rates are particularly useful for expendable drones and ground robots. Battlefield software is better judged through operational users, expanding contracts and integration into command structures. Commercial space is visible through long-term service procurement, while large autonomous platforms and directed-energy weapons are better judged by movement into production, programs of record and realistic operational testing.
Ukraine provides unusually clear evidence because wartime consumption makes the difference between experimentation and sustained use easier to see. We used Ukrainian procurement and battlefield adoption as one benchmark, then compared it with decisions from the United States, NATO members, European institutions and Australia to see which trends were spreading beyond a single war.
The final assessment is a structured aggregation rather than a mechanical score. We compared the strength, freshness and consistency of the available evidence across these dimensions, with priority given to direct government, military, procurement and regulatory sources. Company disclosures were used when the company itself was the primary source for a contract, operating metric or financial figure.
Key sources include the Ukraine Ministry of Defence on FPV-drone and ground-robot deliveries, the Ukraine Ministry of Defence on DOT-Chain Defence, the Defence Procurement Agency on interceptor-drone deliveries, the U.S. Army on its UAS Marketplace, the NATO announcement on counter-drone investment, and the NATO Communications and Information Agency's counter-drone testing.
For loitering munitions, battlefield software and AI, we also used the U.S. Department of Defense on Replicator, the European Defence Agency on joint loitering-munition procurement, the initial Pentagon Maven production contract, the later Maven contract expansion, NATO Allied Command Transformation on DELTA, and Palantir's 2025 Form 10-K.
For commercial space, larger autonomous platforms and directed energy, key sources include the National Reconnaissance Office's commercial imagery procurement, Space Systems Command on the expansion of its pLEO services vehicle, the Australian Department of Defence on Ghost Shark, the U.S. Air Force's Collaborative Combat Aircraft live-fire test, the U.S. Northern Command account of operational high-energy-laser use, and the U.S. Army's first production contract for the Enduring-High Energy Laser system.
This chart, included in our defense tech market deck, shows how tactical networking platform technology has evolved over time
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