How do biotechnology business models actually work?
In our biotechnology market deck, you will find everything you need to understand the market
SUMMARY
Biotechnology business models work by monetizing biology at very different points in the value chain, from owning a drug to selling tools, tests, manufacturing capacity, research services, royalties, seeds or industrial biological products.
The biggest economic divide is not really between “biotech” and “pharma.” It is between companies that absorb the risk of biological failure themselves and companies that get paid while somebody else carries most of that risk.
Therapeutics offer the largest upside but also the strangest economics. A company can spend for a decade with little revenue, then create enormous value from one successful medicine because years of scientific uncertainty have finally been removed.
Licensing turns that scientific progress into cash before commercialization. The headline numbers can be spectacular, but most of the value usually sits in milestones and royalties that will only be paid if the drug keeps succeeding.
This makes a pre-revenue biotech less unusual than it first appears. What it is really producing is evidence: every credible experiment, clinical result and regulatory step can increase the value of the rights attached to the molecule.
The steadier biotech models usually sit one layer away from drug ownership. Research tools, CROs, CDMOs and diagnostics can spread their exposure across hundreds or thousands of programs instead of depending on one binary clinical result.
Recurring revenue in biotechnology often comes from physical consumption rather than software subscriptions. Sequencing reagents, bioprocessing materials, genetic tests and seeds all have to be purchased again as customers repeat the underlying activity.
Calling something a “platform” does not make it scalable. The better platforms eventually turn reusable science into standardized products, repeatable services, higher utilization or falling unit costs; otherwise the platform can remain scientifically impressive and commercially awkward.
Industrial biotech shows how much pricing power matters. Enzymes and microorganisms can support excellent economics when they measurably improve an expensive customer process, while attempts to replace cheap commodities through capital-intensive fermentation leave far less room for error.
The strongest biotechnology models today therefore sit at two ends of the risk spectrum: highly successful proprietary drugs offer extraordinary upside, while diversified tools, royalties, outsourced services, scaled diagnostics, agricultural traits and differentiated biosolutions offer more predictable ways to participate in biological innovation.
This market map, featured in our biotechnology market deck, highlights top companies and startups in the biotechnology market
Are all biotechnology companies really running the same business?
Biotechnology companies currently run several fundamentally different businesses, and the biggest divide is who carries the risk that the biology fails.
A therapeutics company may spend years developing one drug before earning product revenue. A CRO such as Medpace gets paid to run the clinical trial. Lonza gets paid to manufacture the molecule. Illumina gets paid when laboratories sequence biological samples. Natera gets paid each time it runs an eligible genetic test. Novonesis sells enzymes and microorganisms into food, agriculture and industrial processes.
Those revenue streams behave very differently. In 2025, Danaher's Biotechnology segment generated about $7.3 billion of sales and classified 88% of them as recurring. At the other extreme, hundreds of listed therapeutic biotechs still depend on investor capital because their drugs have yet to reach the market.
The useful dividing line is what customers actually pay for and who absorbs the loss when the biology goes wrong.
| Biotechnology model | What actually generates revenue | Main risk |
|---|---|---|
| Therapeutics | Medicine sales | Clinical failure and patent expiry |
| Licensing | Upfront payments, milestones and royalties | Milestones may never happen |
| Research tools | Instruments, reagents, DNA and consumables | Research spending cycles |
| CRO/CDMO | Trials, development and manufacturing services | Customer spending and utilization |
| Diagnostics | Tests performed | Reimbursement and adoption |
| Industrial biotech | Enzymes, microbes, ingredients and process technology | Manufacturing economics |
| Agricultural biotech | Seeds, traits and royalties | Regulation and crop economics |
What is a pre-revenue biotech actually selling?
A pre-revenue therapeutics biotech sells progressively de-risked rights to a future medicine long before it sells the medicine itself.
Early in development, the company may own little more than patents, laboratory data and a scientific hypothesis. Animal results add evidence. Human safety data remove another uncertainty. A convincing Phase II trial can change the value of the asset again because a potential buyer now has evidence that the drug works in actual patients.
That progression explains why a biotech with almost no revenue can suddenly become worth billions. The company has produced valuable information about an asset whose future cash flows are still uncertain.
We can see this clearly in the rise of China-origin drug licensing. DealForma data showed global pharmaceutical companies signing 76 licensing deals with Chinese biopharma companies in 2025, compared with 29 in 2022. Announced value rose from $23 billion to roughly $99 billion over the same period, while upfront payments increased from around $1 billion to $6.1 billion.
The buyers were largely paying for molecules that had already passed enough scientific tests to become interesting. In biotech, experimental evidence itself can be monetized because every successful development step changes the odds of eventually reaching patients.
As this chart shows, and as featured in our biotechnology market deck, search interest in biotech has been trending upward
Why are biotech licensing deals so huge right now?
Biotech licensing is booming right now because Big Pharma needs replacement drugs while smaller biotech companies need capital, creating a huge market for transferring promising assets between companies.
The scale has moved well beyond occasional partnerships. J.P. Morgan's DealForma review counted $166.7 billion of announced biopharma R&D licensing value in the first half of 2026. Over the same period, biopharma M&A reached $96 billion while venture investors put $16.3 billion into the sector.
The imbalance is striking. Announced licensing value was more than ten times venture funding. A large part of modern biotech therefore works through asset transfers rather than startups simply raising money until they launch every drug themselves.
Big Pharma has a strong reason to participate. Evaluate estimates that more than $300 billion of annual prescription-drug revenue will face loss of exclusivity by the end of the decade. Every blockbuster that loses patent protection leaves a hole that has to be filled by internal R&D, licensing or acquisitions.
Recent deals show how aggressive that search has become. GSK agreed to a Hengrui transaction carrying as much as $12.5 billion of potential value. Bristol Myers Squibb's BioNTech partnership around BNT327 reached as much as $11.1 billion. Pfizer's deal for rights to 3SBio's PD-1/VEGF bispecific included more than $6 billion of potential consideration.
Small biotechs are increasingly acting as specialist discovery and development shops, while larger pharmaceutical companies buy into the assets once enough scientific uncertainty has disappeared.
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest biotechnology market report.
When a biotech announces a $10 billion deal, how much cash does it really get?
A biotech announcing a $10 billion licensing deal usually receives only a fraction of that amount upfront, with most of the headline value dependent on future success.
Across the $166.7 billion of biopharma licensing value recorded by J.P. Morgan in the first half of 2026, upfront cash represented just 6% of announced deal value. That works out to roughly $10 billion of immediate payments and about $157 billion tied to later milestones or other contingent economics.
Individual transactions make the point pretty quickly. GSK's deal with Hengrui included around $500 million upfront against as much as $12.5 billion of potential value. Bristol Myers Squibb committed $1.5 billion upfront in its BioNTech transaction, whose headline value reached $11.1 billion. Pfizer's 3SBio agreement had a relatively larger $1.25 billion upfront payment against about $6.05 billion of upfront and milestone consideration, plus royalties.
Development milestones may be triggered when a drug advances through clinical trials. Regulatory milestones can arrive after approval. Commercial milestones often require the product to cross specified sales thresholds. Royalties then give the original owner a percentage of future product revenue.
A $10 billion biotech deal therefore describes how valuable the partnership could eventually become. The cash received on signing can easily be closer to $500 million or $1 billion.
| Deal | Upfront cash | Potential announced value | Upfront as share of headline value |
|---|---|---|---|
| GSK / Hengrui | $500M | Up to $12.5B | ~4% |
| BMS / BioNTech | $1.5B | Up to $11.1B | ~14% |
| Pfizer / 3SBio | $1.25B | About $6.05B plus royalties | ~21% |
This chart, featured in our biotechnology market deck, illustrates yearly venture capital funding for biotechnology startups
Why can a biotech lose money for ten years and still be valuable?
Therapeutic biotech can stay unprofitable for years because the industry spends heavily before approval and makes its money from a small number of outsized winners.
Drug development forces most spending to happen before meaningful product revenue appears. Companies pay for discovery, toxicology, manufacturing, clinical trials and regulatory work while the drug can still fail at almost every stage.
Deloitte's latest study of 20 large biopharma companies estimated an average cost of about $2.67 billion to take an asset from discovery to launch in 2025. That figure includes the wider economics of portfolios where unsuccessful programs consume money that eventually has to be recovered from the winners.
Those winners can be enormous. Merck's Keytruda generated $31.6 billion of sales in 2025. One drug at that scale can support years of research spending across dozens of programs.
The payoff curve is brutal. Many projects produce zero commercial revenue, some become modest medicines, and a small number turn into products worth several billion dollars per year.
So when we value an early biotech, current profit tells us very little on its own. The more useful questions are how much cash the company has, how many important clinical events remain, what those trials could prove and how valuable the asset becomes if they succeed.
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest biotechnology market report.
Should a biotech license its drug or sell it itself?
A biotech should usually keep commercial rights only when it has enough capital, launch capability and confidence in the asset to justify carrying the extra risk.
Keeping the drug can produce much bigger economics. Alnylam now shows what happens when a biotech successfully crosses from R&D into commercialization. In its latest reported quarter, Alnylam generated $1.17 billion of global net product revenue, up 74% year over year, with its transthyretin franchise alone exceeding $1 billion.
That revenue belongs largely to Alnylam because the company spent years building the clinical, regulatory and commercial infrastructure required to launch its own medicines. The reward is much larger than receiving a single-digit or low-double-digit royalty on somebody else's sales.
A smaller company may have a very different calculation. Running a global Phase III program, manufacturing commercial supply, negotiating reimbursement and building a sales force can require hundreds of millions of additional dollars. Licensing the drug transfers some of those costs to a larger partner while giving the biotech upfront cash and continued exposure through milestones and royalties.
Regional deals offer a middle ground. A biotech can commercialize a drug itself in the United States while licensing China, Europe or other territories to companies with stronger local infrastructure.
Licensing is basically a decision about how much future upside the company is willing to exchange for cash, lower spending and lower execution risk today.
This chart, featured in our biotechnology market deck, looks at Vertex’s strategy in biotechnology
Can a biotech live mainly on royalties?
A biotech can live mainly on royalties, and Royalty Pharma shows that the model becomes extremely cash-generative once the portfolio is diversified.
Royalty Pharma buys interests in pharmaceutical products rather than building a conventional drug-development pipeline from scratch. In its latest quarter, royalty receipts reached $768 million, up 14% year over year. Portfolio receipts were $773 million and adjusted EBITDA reached $736 million.
The gap between revenue coming in and operating costs is unusually attractive because Royalty Pharma does not need to manufacture, market and distribute every product generating those royalties. Its portfolio currently spans more than 35 approved products and 19 development-stage therapies.
Diversification is what makes the model really interesting. A small biotech earning a royalty from one drug still depends heavily on that drug's clinical profile, competitive position and patent life. Royalty Pharma can absorb weakness in one product because dozens of other assets continue generating cash.
Its latest portfolio shows that in practice. Royalty receipts from Tremfya grew 53% year over year, Evrysdi rose 42% and Voranigo 72%, while Promacta fell 75% as U.S. generic competition hit the product. The portfolio still grew overall.
For a biotech founder, selling part of a royalty can also turn future revenue into cash immediately. That cash can finance the next drug without issuing as much new equity.
Do biotech platforms actually scale like software?
Most biotech platforms still do not scale like software today; the strongest ones turn reusable science into standardized products or repeatable services.
Twist Bioscience gives us a useful current example. Twist manufactures synthetic DNA using a silicon-based platform, but customers ultimately buy concrete outputs such as genes, oligos and sequencing products. Its latest quarter delivered record revenue of $118.4 million, up 23% year over year, marking its 14th consecutive quarter of sequential revenue growth. Gross margin reached 52.8%.
Volume is growing even faster in parts of the business. Twist shipped roughly 369,000 genes during the quarter, compared with 237,000 a year earlier. Its DNA Synthesis and Protein Solutions revenue grew 39%. More output moving through the same manufacturing system is beginning to produce the kind of operating leverage that investors hope to see from a platform.
Ginkgo Bioworks shows why the word "platform" alone tells us very little. Ginkgo spent years building a broad cell-programming and automation infrastructure, but revenue in its latest quarter fell 48% year over year to $20 million as the company rationalized older programs. It is now concentrating much more heavily on autonomous laboratories and cloud-lab infrastructure.
Both companies own reusable biological technology. Twist has already turned much of its platform into clearly priced products that thousands of customers reorder. Ginkgo is still working through a major change in how its infrastructure gets packaged and sold.
The test is simpler than the platform story often makes it sound: do more programs create repeat revenue, better capacity utilization or lower unit costs? Scientific reuse on its own does not guarantee a scalable business.
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest biotechnology market report.
This chart, featured in our biotechnology market deck, illustrates yearly funding for biotechnology startups
Why do biotech tools often make steadier money than drug companies?
Biotech tools are usually steadier businesses than drug development because customers pay for experiments, sequencing and manufacturing inputs across thousands of unrelated programs.
Illumina shows how powerful that can become. In its latest quarter, revenue reached $1.16 billion, up 9.5% year over year, while GAAP gross margin reached 66.4%. Illumina's installed sequencing systems also drive repeated purchases of flow cells, reagents and other consumables long after the original machine is installed.
The company's 2025 figures showed sequencing and array consumables producing roughly three quarters of total revenue. This resembles the economics of selling printers and then supplying the ink, except the underlying customers are laboratories processing increasing volumes of biological data.
Danaher's bioprocessing businesses have another version of the model. Its Biotechnology segment generated about $7.3 billion in 2025, with 88% of sales classified as recurring. Filters, chromatography products, resins and other materials are repeatedly consumed as customers develop and manufacture biologic medicines.
The diversification is just as valuable as the recurring purchases. A failed oncology program may be catastrophic for the biotech that owns it. For a supplier serving hundreds or thousands of programs, that same failure is one small piece of overall demand.
Biotech tools offer a simpler way to benefit from growing biological R&D: sell scientists something they need every time they run another experiment.
How do CROs and CDMOs make money without owning the drug?
CROs and CDMOs make money by charging biotech companies for clinical execution and manufacturing capacity while leaving most drug-outcome risk with the sponsor.
Medpace is a good current example on the clinical side. The CRO generated $707 million of revenue in its latest quarter, up 17% year over year, while EBITDA reached $153 million and its backlog remained above $3 billion. Customers are paying Medpace to manage clinical development whether an individual drug eventually becomes a blockbuster or disappears after the trial.
Lonza monetizes a different bottleneck: making the drug. In the first half of 2026, Lonza generated CHF3.4 billion of sales, growing 16% at constant exchange rates. Core EBITDA margin reached 34.8%, up 4.4 percentage points from the previous year.
Its growth was broad. Integrated Biologics grew 10% at constant exchange rates, Advanced Synthesis 27.7% and Specialized Modalities 22.6%. Lonza is benefiting from customers outsourcing increasingly complex manufacturing rather than every drug developer building its own facilities.
These businesses still carry real risk. A CRO suffers when biotech companies cancel trials. A CDMO can lose money when factories sit underused. Large manufacturing sites also require substantial capital.
But their exposure is spread across many drugs and many customers. Medpace and Lonza convert a series of binary scientific bets into businesses driven much more by bookings, utilization and execution.
This chart, featured in our biotechnology market deck, compares the main business model options for biotech platform companies
How do genetic-testing companies actually make money from a test?
Genetic-testing companies make money when test volume, reimbursement and lab economics line up, and current results show how wide the gap can be between adoption and profitability.
Natera currently shows the model working at scale. The company processed about 1.04 million tests in its latest quarter, 22% more than a year earlier. Revenue grew much faster, up 38% to $753 million, because average selling prices improved as well. Gross margin reached 64.5%.
Its oncology business is growing even faster, with oncology test volume up 57%. Each additional reimbursed test pushes more revenue through a laboratory network that already exists, which can make the economics increasingly attractive as volume rises.
GRAIL is in a much earlier commercial position with Galleri. Galleri test volume increased 35% year over year in its latest quarter to more than 61,000 tests, while Galleri revenue rose 24% to $42.6 million. Yet GRAIL still recorded a $12.6 million gross loss and a $110 million net loss for the quarter.
That comparison shows why "number of tests sold" is an incomplete metric. We need to know how much the company collects per test, whether insurers or employers pay, what each laboratory run costs and how much commercial infrastructure is required to create demand.
Natera has already crossed the million-tests-per-quarter mark with positive gross margins. GRAIL is still proving that a scientifically ambitious cancer-screening test can become a broadly reimbursed and economically attractive routine service.
| Latest quarter | Natera | GRAIL |
|---|---|---|
| Test volume | ~1.04M total tests | >61,000 Galleri tests |
| YoY volume growth | +22% | +35% |
| Revenue | $753M | $44.7M total |
| Gross result | 64.5% gross margin | $12.6M gross loss |
| Commercial position | Large reimbursed testing business | Earlier-stage screening market |
Can industrial biotech actually be a good business?
Industrial biotech can be an excellent business today when biology improves a high-value process, while commodity-scale production remains far harder.
Novonesis is currently the strongest proof. The biosolutions company sells enzymes and microorganisms into food, household products, agriculture, energy and health. In the first half of 2026, organic sales grew 8% and adjusted EBITDA margin reached 37.7%. The company raised its full-year growth outlook after second-quarter organic growth accelerated to 9%.
Those are unusually strong margins for a company selling physical biological products. Novonesis succeeds because customers buy enzymes for what those enzymes do: increase yield, change food properties, reduce energy consumption, improve cleaning or make an industrial process cheaper.
The economics become much tougher when biotechnology competes mainly on production cost. LanzaTech, which uses microbes to convert waste carbon into fuels and chemicals, generated only $55.8 million of revenue in 2025 while adjusted EBITDA remained negative by more than $70 million. The company also warned about its ability to continue without additional capital.
Amyris had already provided an even harsher example. The synthetic-biology pioneer tried to combine fermentation technology, ingredient manufacturing and consumer brands before entering Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2023.
There is a pretty clear dividing line here. Industrial biotech works well when the biological product creates enough customer value to support healthy pricing. Trying to replace a cheap commodity with an expensive new fermentation process is a much less forgiving game.
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest biotechnology market report.
This chart, featured in our biotechnology market deck, breaks down revenue across customer segments in the biotechnology market
How does agricultural biotech make money every planting season?
Agricultural biotech makes money by selling seeds and traits into a purchase cycle that repeats every planting season.
The model is much more mature than many people realize. Bayer's Crop Science division generated €4.91 billion of sales in its latest quarter. Soybean Seed & Traits sales grew 16.9% on a currency- and portfolio-adjusted basis, while Cotton Seed sales jumped 69.2% following the return of the dicamba label in the United States.
Corteva shows the same economics from another angle. Its seed business generated more than $3.0 billion of sales in the first quarter of 2026, up 12% year over year. Corn alone represented $2.37 billion. Higher volume explained roughly half of the overall seed growth, while pricing and product mix also contributed.
Biotechnology sits inside those numbers through traits for insect resistance, herbicide tolerance, yield and other characteristics. Companies can sell their own seed carrying those traits or license the intellectual property to other seed producers and collect royalties.
The recurring element comes naturally from agriculture. Farmers need new seed every season, and a trait that reliably improves economic performance can be monetized over millions of acres.
That produces very different economics from a therapeutic biotech waiting years for a single clinical readout. Agricultural biotech still faces regulation, weather, crop prices and competition, but the mature businesses already operate around a repeated annual purchasing decision.
What happens to a biotech business when patents expire?
Biotech patent expiry can erase billions of dollars of annual revenue within a few years, which is why therapeutic companies are always replacing old franchises.
Humira gives us one of the clearest examples. AbbVie's U.S. Humira revenue reached $18.6 billion in 2022, just before biosimilar competition entered the American market. U.S. revenue then fell to roughly $12.2 billion in 2023, $7.1 billion in 2024 and $3.1 billion in 2025.
That is a decline of about $15.5 billion in three years, wiping out more than 80% of the product's U.S. revenue.
AbbVie survived because replacement products were already growing. Skyrizi reached roughly $17.6 billion of revenue in 2025 while Rinvoq generated about $8.3 billion. Together, those newer drugs had grown large enough to replace Humira's collapsing sales.
This is why successful therapeutic biotech companies keep spending on R&D even when their existing drugs are extremely profitable. Every patent-protected franchise has a clock attached to it.
The industry behaves like a treadmill. Companies discover, license or acquire new medicines, build them into large franchises, harvest years of protected cash flow and then watch competitors eventually arrive. A biotech that stops replenishing its pipeline can look wonderfully profitable right before its economics deteriorate.
This chart, featured in our biotechnology market deck, shows how at-home genetic testing technology has evolved over time
Which biotechnology business models actually work best today?
The best biotechnology business models today either own a highly successful protected medicine or get paid repeatedly without betting the whole company on one biological outcome.
Owning the drug offers the biggest prize. Alnylam now generates more than $1 billion of product revenue per quarter. Keytruda has shown that a single medicine can eventually generate more than $30 billion a year. When clinical success, patent protection and commercial execution all line up, therapeutics can create more value than almost any other biotech model.
The odds are less forgiving. Drug developers spend for years before knowing whether an asset works, and patent protection eventually runs out. A single-asset biotech can move from enormous upside to severe distress after one clinical result.
The most dependable economics currently sit one layer away from that binary risk. Illumina gets paid for sequencing. Danaher sells recurring bioprocessing products. Medpace gets paid to run trials. Lonza gets paid to manufacture medicines. Natera gets paid for tests. Novonesis sells biological products into processes customers already run. Royalty Pharma owns slices of dozens of successful drugs rather than relying on one.
Platform companies deserve more scrutiny. Twist shows that a biological platform can become a strong business once it produces standardized products, rising volumes and better margins. Ginkgo's continuing restructuring shows how much harder the model becomes when reusable technology does not translate cleanly into repeatable commercial demand.
The hierarchy is fairly clear today. Approved proprietary drugs offer the highest upside. Diversified tools, diagnostics, royalties and outsourced services offer the best combination of growth and predictability. Licensing is an effective way to split the difference. Early therapeutic platforms and capital-heavy industrial biotech can still create huge value, but they give companies much less room for mistakes.
| Biotechnology model | How well the model works today | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Approved proprietary therapeutics | Exceptional when successful | Huge revenue and pricing power |
| Research and bioprocess tools | Very strong | Recurring demand across many programs |
| Diversified royalties | Very strong | High cash generation with limited operating infrastructure |
| CRO/CDMO | Strong | Paid for execution rather than drug ownership |
| Reimbursed diagnostics | Strong at scale | Repeated testing with improving unit economics |
| Agricultural seeds and traits | Strong | Annual repeat purchases and licensing |
| Differentiated industrial biosolutions | Strong | Biology creates measurable customer value |
| Licensing-focused biotech | Attractive | Preserves upside while sharing spending and risk |
| Drug-discovery platforms | Mixed | Reusable science does not always produce repeatable revenue |
| Single-asset clinical biotech | Highly asymmetric | Huge upside with concentrated failure risk |
| Commodity-scale industrial biotech | Difficult | Heavy capital needs and unforgiving production economics |
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest biotechnology market report.
OUR METHODOLOGY
We compared biotechnology business models across the economic dimensions that most clearly separate them: what customers actually pay for, how repeatable that revenue is, how much capital the model requires, where scientific and commercial risk sits, how diversified that risk is, and how much of the upside the company keeps when the underlying biology succeeds.
We prioritized recent operating evidence rather than relying on the usual labels attached to each model. That included company revenue, margins, recurring sales, test and product volumes, clinical-services backlog, manufacturing growth, royalty receipts, licensing structures and other observable measures showing how the economics are behaving today.
No single metric determines the ranking. We looked for several pieces of evidence pointing in the same direction: recurring customer activity, improving economics with scale, diversification across products or customers, capital intensity, exposure to binary scientific outcomes and the ability to retain value after a successful product reaches the market.
Licensing was assessed separately because announced deal value can badly overstate the cash a biotech receives when a transaction is signed. We used J.P. Morgan and DealForma data alongside the disclosed structures of the GSK/Hengrui, Bristol Myers Squibb/BioNTech and Pfizer/3SBio transactions to distinguish upfront payments from contingent milestones and royalties.
For therapeutics, tools, royalties, platforms, outsourced services, diagnostics and agricultural biotechnology, we used companies as evidence of the underlying business mechanism rather than treating one company as proof of an entire category. Examples include Merck and Alnylam for proprietary drugs, Danaher and Illumina for tools and bioprocessing, Royalty Pharma for diversified royalties, Twist Bioscience and Ginkgo Bioworks for platforms, Medpace and Lonza for CRO/CDMO economics, Natera and GRAIL for genetic testing, and Corteva for agricultural biotechnology.
The final hierarchy is our assessment of how these models are working today. It reflects the balance between upside, repeatability, diversification, capital requirements and exposure to biological failure rather than a universal formula that will apply to every biotechnology company.
Key sources include J.P. Morgan / DealForma on biopharma licensing activity, GSK on its Hengrui agreement, Bristol Myers Squibb on the BioNTech partnership, Pfizer on its 3SBio agreement, Danaher's 2025 results, Merck's 2025 Form 10-K, Alnylam's 2026 financial results, Royalty Pharma's Q2 2026 results, Twist Bioscience's fiscal 2026 releases, Ginkgo Bioworks' Q2 2026 disclosure, Illumina's Q2 2026 results, Medpace's Q2 2026 results, Lonza's H1 2026 results, Natera's Q2 2026 results, GRAIL's Q2 2026 results, Corteva's Q1 2026 results, and AbbVie's 2025 Form 10-K.
In our biotechnology market deck, we identify pain points entrepreneurs should prioritize
