Which InsurTech startups have found a model that actually works?
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SUMMARY
Several InsurTech startups have found models that actually work, but the strongest examples are the companies that became good insurance businesses rather than simply good technology companies. Oscar Health, Root and Kin provide the clearest evidence today, while Hippo, ManyPets, Marshmallow and Alan have also proved narrower or reshaped versions of their original models.
The funding reset made the differences much easier to see. Global InsurTech funding remains far below its 2021 peak, yet profitability has improved across several former high-burn companies, suggesting that less abundant capital forced the sector toward better underwriting and operating discipline.
Root may be the cleanest turnaround. Its combined ratio has fallen below 92%, expenses have declined and the company is profitable, even though management has deliberately accepted slower premium growth rather than chasing market share at unattractive prices.
Oscar shows that InsurTech can work at much larger scale. Nearly three million members now sit on top of improving medical and administrative cost ratios, turning what was once a heavily loss-making growth story into a business generating substantial GAAP earnings.
Kin suggests that the best InsurTech model does not always require the startup itself to hold all the insurance capital. Its reciprocal structure separates much of the policy risk from the technology and management company, and both sides are currently profitable.
Several apparent successes came only after the original startup thesis changed. Hippo is profitable largely as a broader insurance platform rather than as the pure digital-home insurer investors originally backed, while ManyPets improved sharply after abandoning US expansion and concentrating again on UK pet insurance.
Specialization appears to help. Marshmallow focuses on motor customers traditional insurers can struggle to price, ManyPets concentrates on pet insurance, and Alan benefits from employer distribution rather than acquiring every insured person one by one.
Cyber insurance may have the strongest technological logic in the sector. Coalition and At-Bay can monitor customers after a policy is written and intervene before or during incidents, giving their software a direct connection to claims costs rather than merely making insurance easier to buy.
Lemonade is the clearest company still sitting on the boundary. Its loss ratio, claims automation and cash generation have improved dramatically, but sustained EBITDA and GAAP profitability would make the case much harder to argue against.
The broader pattern is now fairly clear: better apps were never enough. The InsurTech companies that are working have improved pricing, claims, expenses, distribution or capital efficiency in ways that show up in the underlying insurance economics.
Some of the most hyped startups in this space lost most of their value. Find out what went wrong in our InsurTech market report.
Why are we asking whether InsurTech actually works now?
InsurTech finally gives us enough financial evidence to separate companies with real economics from companies that were mostly good at raising money and selling policies.
During the funding boom, that distinction was surprisingly difficult to make. Gallagher Re estimates that global InsurTech funding reached roughly $15.8 billion in 2021, before falling to $7.1 billion in 2022, $4.5 billion in 2023 and $4.25 billion in 2024. Funding recovered to $5.08 billion in 2025, but it was still less than one-third of the peak.
That reset changed how companies behaved. Root slowed growth and tightened pricing. Hippo changed the mix of insurance it writes. ManyPets withdrew from the US. Wefox sold operations and moved toward a lighter MGA and distribution model. Lemonade changed its reinsurance structure while pushing down loss ratios. NEXT improved underwriting before Munich Re took full control of the business.
We can now see the result in actual profits. Root generated $61.3 million of net income in the first half of 2026. Oscar Health generated more than $1 billion. Hippo moved into GAAP profitability. Kin's management company and the reciprocal insurers it manages are profitable. ManyPets reported its first annual profit. Alan says its French operation is EBITDA profitable.
What does an InsurTech model need to prove before we can say it works?
For us, an InsurTech model works when customer demand, underwriting and operating costs can coexist without permanent outside subsidies.
For an insurer carrying risk on its own balance sheet, underwriting is the first test. A combined ratio below 100% means earned premium is covering claims and underwriting expenses before investment income. One good quarter can happen through benign weather, reserve movements or unusually low claims, so we want to see improvement across several periods.
Root clears that bar much more convincingly today than it did several years ago. Oscar's medical-loss ratio and administrative costs have both improved as membership has scaled. Hippo now reports a combined ratio below 100%. ManyPets lowered its loss ratio while cutting costs enough to turn profitable.
Companies that operate as MGAs, reciprocal managers or distributors need a different test because somebody else may provide much of the insurance capital. For them, we care about whether insurers continue supplying capacity, whether the underwriting book remains attractive to those partners and whether fees or commissions can cover the startup's own costs.
Cyber insurers add another useful test: can the technology actually reduce losses? Coalition and At-Bay can monitor security risks during the policy period, which gives their software a direct connection to claims economics.
| Company | Main model | Best evidence today | Our view |
|---|---|---|---|
| Root | Full-stack digital auto insurer | Profitable with combined ratio below 100% | Proven |
| Oscar Health | Individual health insurer | Large GAAP profit and improving medical costs | Proven |
| Kin | Reciprocal manager + digital home insurance | Profitable manager and profitable carriers | Proven |
| Hippo | Diversified insurance platform | GAAP profit and combined ratio below 100% | Proven after pivot |
| ManyPets | Specialist pet insurer | First annual profit and lower loss ratio | Proven in the UK |
| Marshmallow | Specialist motor insurer | Positive underwriting result | Proven, but narrower |
| Alan | Employer health insurance + services | French operation EBITDA profitable | Proven in France |
| Lemonade | Multi-line digital insurer | Stronger underwriting, still GAAP loss-making | Nearly proven |
| NEXT Insurance | Digital small-business insurance | Better underwriting before acquisition | Strategically validated |
| Coalition | Cyber insurance + security | Large book and strong carrier partnerships | Strong, less financially transparent |
Is the market overpaying? Our InsurTech market report compares valuations across the players that matter.
Has Root finally proved that digital car insurance can make money?
Yes. Root currently gives us one of the cleanest examples of a digital InsurTech fixing its underwriting and becoming a genuinely profitable insurer.
Root generated $61.3 million of net income and $100.6 million of adjusted EBITDA in the first half of 2026. Its net combined ratio reached 91.7%, compared with 95.4% a year earlier and 102.4% two years earlier. At roughly 92%, Root is keeping about eight cents of underwriting margin for every dollar of net earned premium before investment income and other items.
The interesting part is what happened to growth while those economics improved. Policies in force reached about 484,000 in the second quarter, up 6% year over year, while gross written premium fell 2%. Management said the direct-auto market had become more competitive and chose to manage growth carefully.
Root's telematics is now difficult to dismiss as just a marketing feature. The company says its technology has analyzed more than 36 billion miles of driving. That gives Root a proprietary behavioural dataset that can feed directly into risk selection and pricing.
Operating costs are moving in the right direction too. Root's first-half net expense ratio fell from 30.3% to 27.6%. Combined with a 64.1% loss-and-loss-adjustment ratio, that produced the 91.7% combined ratio.
The next test is whether Root can accelerate customer growth again without giving back those underwriting gains.
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest InsurTech market report.
Has Oscar Health proved that InsurTech can work at massive scale?
Yes. Oscar Health has moved far beyond the experimental InsurTech stage and is now producing serious profits across almost three million health-insurance members.
Oscar generated about $9.53 billion of revenue in the first half of 2026, up from $5.91 billion a year earlier. Net income attributable to Oscar reached roughly $1.04 billion, compared with only $46.9 million over the same period in 2025.
The operating ratios explain the jump. Oscar's medical loss ratio fell from 83.0% to 75.0%, while its SG&A expense ratio dropped from 17.2% to 14.7%. Membership reached 2.96 million at the end of the second quarter, up from about 2.03 million a year earlier.
In practical terms, Oscar is getting two improvements at once. A smaller share of premium is being consumed by medical claims, while a smaller share is also being consumed by administration.
We should still be careful with the headline profit. Second-quarter results included $164 million of favorable prior-period reserve development, and US individual health insurance remains sensitive to risk-adjustment calculations, premium rates and medical-cost inflation.
Even with that qualification, Oscar has already crossed the line from interesting InsurTech to large profitable insurer.
Some startups are growing their valuation much faster than others. Our InsurTech market report shows who's pulling ahead.
Has Kin found a better structure for digital home insurance?
Yes. Kin currently has one of the most convincing InsurTech structures because its technology company can earn attractive management economics without retaining all of the homeowners risk itself.
Kin manages reciprocal insurance exchanges whose policyholders supply the capital supporting the insurance risk. Kin Insurance, Inc. provides the technology, distribution and management layer and earns revenue from operating those exchanges.
Premium in force across Kin's managed exchanges reached $701.1 million in the second quarter of 2026, up 23% year over year, while gross written premium reached $218.9 million. Kin Insurance generated $68 million of quarterly revenue and $28.6 million of baseline operating income.
The carriers were profitable too. Kin reported more than $25 million of combined adjusted net income across its managed reciprocal insurers during the quarter.
The most interesting number may be overhead. Between the second quarter of 2025 and the second quarter of 2026, premium in force increased by $129 million while Kin Insurance's G&A costs rose only $1.7 million. That works out to roughly $80 of additional premium in force for each incremental dollar of G&A.
Kin has also started showing why bundling can make the model stronger. According to the company, customers who add auto insurance churn at roughly half the rate of home-only customers, producing two to three times greater lifetime value.
Home insurance in catastrophe-exposed states will always need substantial capital and reinsurance. Kin's structure leaves much of that burden with the reciprocal insurers while the management company scales more efficiently.
Did Hippo's original digital-home insurance idea actually work?
Only partly. Hippo has built a profitable insurance company, but today's Hippo relies much less on the homeowners-focused model that originally made the startup famous.
Hippo generated $482 million of gross written premium in the second quarter of 2026, up 61.5% year over year, while revenue reached $145 million. The company reported $10 million of GAAP net income, $21 million of adjusted net income and a 95.8% combined ratio.
The business mix tells the more interesting story. Homeowners insurance represented only 22% of quarterly gross written premium. Casualty had grown to 37%, while commercial multi-peril accounted for another 29%.
Hippo spent years reducing its dependence on a volatile homeowners book and expanding program, casualty and commercial insurance. The company now expects more than $1.65 billion of full-year gross written premium and up to $70 million of adjusted net income.
Hippo belongs among the successful InsurTechs, but the business that works today is much broader than the original digital-home proposition.
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest InsurTech market report.
Who pays the bills matters as much as how much. We look at customer concentration in our InsurTech market report.
Has Lemonade finally found a profitable InsurTech model?
Almost. Lemonade's underwriting looks dramatically healthier today, but the company still needs to turn those gains into sustained corporate profit before we call the model fully proven.
Lemonade's latest reported in-force premium reached $1.43 billion, up about 32% year over year, extending its streak of accelerating in-force-premium growth to 11 quarters. Customer count reached 3.31 million and revenue increased 79% to $294 million.
The underwriting trend is even more important. Lemonade's gross loss ratio fell to 60% from 67% a year earlier. Two years earlier, the same quarterly ratio was 79%. Claims-adjustment expenses also fell to a record-low 5% of premium, which Lemonade attributes largely to automated claims handling.
Adjusted free cash flow reached $19 million and has now been positive for five consecutive quarters and eight of the last nine.
The gap is still visible on the income statement. Lemonade lost about $43 million on a GAAP basis during the second quarter and roughly $79 million during the first half. Adjusted EBITDA was still negative by about $19 million for the quarter.
Seven percentage points of favorable prior-period development also helped the reported 60% gross loss ratio.
Lemonade is close. Sustained EBITDA profitability would materially change its status. Until then, it remains just outside the proven group.
Do specialist InsurTechs work better than companies trying to insure everyone?
Quite often. ManyPets and Marshmallow show how a narrow underwriting problem can become a better business than a broad attempt to sell every type of insurance through one app.
Marshmallow concentrated on UK motor customers who are difficult for traditional insurers to price, particularly immigrants and drivers with limited UK insurance histories. Its underwriting uses information such as international driving experience that may be less useful in conventional domestic pricing models.
Marshmallow's regulated insurance company reported about £230.6 million of gross written premium in its 2025 financial year and an underwriting profit of roughly £2.6 million, following approximately £4.1 million the previous year. Profitability tightened as the UK motor market became more competitive, but the underwriting book remained in the black.
ManyPets reached the same destination through a much rougher route. The company expanded into the US, accumulated heavy losses, then withdrew and refocused on its UK pet-insurance business.
Group gross written premium fell slightly to £232 million in the year ending March 2025 because of that US withdrawal. Yet Many Group moved from a £33 million net loss to a £6.25 million net profit. Its UK loss ratio improved from 78% to 70%, while UK gross written premium stayed almost flat at roughly £218 million.
ManyPets therefore sacrificed geographic expansion while improving the bottom line by almost £40 million.
Both companies point to the same advantage: concentrating on one risk pool gives an insurer more opportunity to build pricing knowledge and claims expertise before adding complexity.
Want to see how much of this market is real today? Find out in our InsurTech market report.
Why does cyber insurance look unusually good for InsurTech?
Cyber insurance may be the best fit between insurance and software because companies such as Coalition and At-Bay can use technology to observe and reduce the risk while the policy is still active.
Coalition continuously scans customers' external attack surfaces, identifies vulnerabilities and provides incident-response capabilities alongside insurance. Its latest cyber-claims study covers more than 100,000 policyholders across the US, Canada, the UK, Australia and Germany.
The outcomes are unusually tangible. Coalition says 64% of closed claims during 2025 ended with no out-of-pocket loss for the policyholder. Its incident-response teams also negotiated ransom payments down by an average of 65% and recovered $21.8 million in stolen funds.
Coalition can gather security information before underwriting a company and keep observing that company afterward. The data loop is much faster than in insurance categories where the insurer sees the customer mainly at application, renewal and claim.
Large incumbents clearly see value in that model. Allianz expanded its relationship with Coalition and handed it responsibility for areas including cyber pricing, product development, risk mitigation and claims management.
At-Bay follows a similar approach, combining cyber coverage with security around email, cloud systems, identity and endpoints. Munich Re has now agreed to acquire At-Bay for an enterprise value of $575 million and plans to combine the business with HSB's existing cyber capabilities.
The MGA structure used by companies in this category also helps explain the economics. Startups can concentrate on underwriting, distribution and security while established carriers or reinsurers provide much of the capacity. The trade-off is dependence on those partners, so the startup has to keep producing an attractive insurance book.
Cyber gives companies a credible way to do that because their software can influence both risk selection and claims.
| What the technology can do | Typical digital insurance | Cyber InsurTech |
|---|---|---|
| Sell policies online | Yes | Yes |
| Monitor risk continuously | Limited | Core capability |
| Detect new risk during the policy | Rarely | Yes |
| Help prevent a claim | Sometimes | Central to product |
| Generate underwriting data continuously | Limited | Potentially extensive |
| Intervene during an incident | Mostly after a claim | Often immediately |
| Link software directly to claims costs | Weak to moderate | Strong |
| Examples | Lemonade, Root | Coalition, At-Bay |
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest InsurTech market report.
Has Alan proved that employer health InsurTech can work in Europe?
Yes in France. Alan's latest numbers show that its original employer-health business can reach profitability while the company continues growing quickly, although international expansion still has more to prove.
Alan ended the second quarter of 2026 with roughly €840 million of signed annual recurring revenue and 1.14 million members, representing about 55% year-over-year growth. Earlier in the year, the company said new-business acquisition had risen 60% while investment remained roughly comparable.
That combination gives us a better read than membership growth on its own because Alan appears to be acquiring business more efficiently as it scales.
The company also reported that its French operation became EBITDA profitable in 2025. France is Alan's original and largest market, so profitability there provides the clearest evidence that its employer distribution, insurance administration and health-service layer can fit together economically.
Employer health has a structural distribution advantage too. One company contract can bring hundreds or thousands of members at once, which reduces the need to acquire every insured person individually through paid consumer marketing.
Alan is still spending to expand in Belgium, Spain, Canada and other markets. We have strong evidence that the French model works and much less evidence that identical economics will travel everywhere.
Revenue is easy to show, profit is harder. Our InsurTech market report looks at who's actually making money.
Did NEXT Insurance prove that digital small-business insurance works?
NEXT Insurance proved that digital small-business underwriting and distribution can create a valuable platform, though the independent company was still losing money before Munich Re took full ownership.
Munich Re's acquisition materials give us a useful three-year view. NEXT's top line increased from $367 million in 2022 to $438 million in 2023 and $548 million in 2024. During the same period, its loss ratio improved from 78% to 69% and then 65%.
The bottom line improved almost as consistently. NEXT's net loss narrowed from $211 million in 2022 to $130 million in 2023 and $94 million in 2024.
Munich Re nevertheless agreed to buy the remaining NEXT shares in a transaction valuing the company at $2.6 billion. Its own investor presentation explains part of the logic: NEXT had ceded a substantial amount of margin through reinsurance because of its capital-light structure. Inside Munich Re, more of that economics can stay within the same group.
NEXT also generated $54 million of other operating income in 2024 from customers placed with third-party carriers, so the business had already expanded beyond carrying risk itself.
NEXT clearly built valuable underwriting technology and distribution in US small-business insurance. What we still cannot say is that the standalone company had already solved profitability before the acquisition.
Have better underwriting and lower costs mattered more than better apps for InsurTech?
Yes. The clearest InsurTech turnarounds have come from better pricing, lower claims costs and tighter operating expenses rather than from making the buying experience slightly smoother.
Root's net combined ratio moved from above 100% to 91.7%, while its first-half net expense ratio fell from 30.3% to 27.6%.
Lemonade's gross loss ratio moved from 79% in the second quarter of 2024 to 67% a year later and 60% currently. Its claims-adjustment-expense ratio also fell to 5% as the company automated more triage, servicing and simple claim settlement.
NEXT's loss ratio fell from 78% in 2022 to 65% in 2024, while its annual net loss dropped from $211 million to $94 million.
ManyPets lowered its UK loss ratio from 78% to 70% and moved from a £33 million group net loss to a £6.25 million profit.
Operating leverage is showing up elsewhere too. Hippo's expense ratio fell from 53.1% to 45.4% over the latest year-over-year second-quarter comparison. Oscar's SG&A ratio declined from 17.2% to 14.7% while membership climbed toward three million. As seen above, Kin increased managed premium in force by $129 million over twelve months while Kin Insurance's G&A costs rose only $1.7 million.
Across these companies, technology becomes financially useful when it removes points from claims handling, administration or underwriting costs. The app itself is easy to copy. Better insurance economics are much harder.
| Company | What was going wrong | What improved | Where it stands now |
|---|---|---|---|
| Root | Combined ratio above 100% | Pricing + lower expenses | Profitable |
| Lemonade | High loss ratios | Repricing + automation | Close to EBITDA profit |
| Hippo | Heavy homeowners exposure + high expenses | Diversified book + operating leverage | Profitable |
| NEXT | Large underwriting losses | Loss ratio 78% → 65% | Acquired while still loss-making |
| ManyPets | High claims + US expansion costs | UK focus + better pricing | Profitable |
| Oscar | Medical-cost volatility | Pricing + lower administrative costs | Highly profitable |
| Marshmallow | Difficult motor segment | Specialist risk selection | Underwriting profitable |
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest InsurTech market report.
Market share tells you more than funding headlines. See who leads in our InsurTech market report.
Which well-known InsurTechs still have something to prove?
Lemonade, Branch, Pie Insurance and several private cyber companies all look stronger today, but we still lack enough evidence to put them in the same proven category as Root, Oscar or Kin.
Lemonade is the closest. Its 60% gross loss ratio, $1.43 billion of in-force premium and positive adjusted free cash flow are strong. The remaining hurdle is straightforward: turn the corporate income statement profitable and keep it there.
Branch has also improved markedly. Its reciprocal reported a roughly 60% policyholder-surplus-contribution-adjusted loss ratio for 2025 after nine consecutive quarters of improvement. Regulatory figures still showed an underwriting loss of roughly $18 million, though that was far better than around $57 million the previous year.
Pie Insurance has meaningful scale in workers' compensation and small-business insurance. It ended 2025 with more than 55,000 policies in force and a distribution network above 5,000 agents. Public profitability data remains too thin for us to judge it as confidently as the listed insurers.
Coalition creates the opposite problem. Its operating evidence is impressive: more than 100,000 policyholders represented in its latest claims study, measurable loss-prevention outcomes and major relationships with established insurers. As a private company, however, Coalition publishes much less income-statement detail than Root or Lemonade.
Wefox belongs further back in the recovery process. After reaching one of Europe's highest InsurTech valuations, it sold operations and raised €151 million to support a strategy built around asset-light MGA and distribution activities. The new structure may work, but we have not seen enough operating history to say that it does yet.
Which InsurTech startups have actually found a model that works?
Several InsurTech startups have now proved that their models work, with Oscar Health, Root and Kin giving us the strongest evidence today.
Oscar has the clearest proof at scale. The company produced roughly $9.5 billion of first-half revenue, almost three million members and more than $1 billion of net income. Its latest profitability is large enough that we no longer need to debate whether the business can generate earnings.
Root gives us the cleanest traditional underwriting turnaround. A 91.7% first-half combined ratio and $61.3 million of net income show that digital auto insurance can produce real underwriting profits when pricing discipline comes first.
Kin may have the most interesting corporate structure. Its reciprocal insurers carry the policies while Kin Insurance earns management economics, and both sides are currently profitable.
Hippo belongs in the successful group too, although today's profitable company looks substantially different from the homeowners-focused startup investors originally backed.
ManyPets and Marshmallow show that narrower consumer-insurance niches can work. Alan has proven its employer-health economics in France. Coalition and At-Bay look particularly strong strategically because their technology can reduce the cyber risk they insure, although private-company disclosure makes exact profitability harder to judge.
NEXT Insurance built a valuable small-business platform and improved its loss ratio dramatically, but it was still losing $94 million annually before Munich Re agreed to buy the remaining company.
Lemonade sits just outside our top group. Its underwriting improvement is now convincing, growth remains above 30% and adjusted free cash flow is positive. Sustained EBITDA and then GAAP profitability would complete the proof.
| InsurTech | Model that appears to work | Evidence strength | Final judgment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oscar Health | Scaled individual health insurance | Very high | Clearly proven |
| Root | Telematics-driven direct auto | Very high | Clearly proven |
| Kin | Reciprocal insurance + management platform | High | Clearly proven |
| Hippo | Diversified insurance platform | Very high | Proven after pivot |
| ManyPets | Focused UK pet insurance | High | Proven in core market |
| Marshmallow | Specialist motor underwriting | High | Proven, but narrower |
| Alan | Employer health + health services | High in France | Core model proven |
| Coalition | Cyber insurance + active security | Medium-high | Strongly validated |
| At-Bay | Cyber insurance + security | Medium-high | Strongly validated |
| NEXT Insurance | Digital SMB insurance | High | Valuable, standalone profitability was unfinished |
| Lemonade | Automated multi-line direct insurance | Very high | Very close |
| Branch | Reciprocal home and auto | Medium | Improving |
| Pie Insurance | Specialist SMB insurance | Medium | Scale proven, profits unclear |
| wefox | MGA + distribution after restructuring | Medium | Still being tested |
The larger InsurTech lesson is fairly simple now. Technology creates value when it improves pricing, lowers claims costs, cuts operating expenses, changes distribution economics or reduces the capital needed to run the business.
Root's telematics feeds pricing. Coalition's security software can reduce cyber losses. Kin's platform supports a capital-efficient reciprocal structure. Oscar spreads administrative costs across millions of members. Alan can bring hundreds or thousands of employees onto the platform through one employer relationship.
Growth alone did a poor job of predicting which InsurTech companies would survive.
The startups working today are the ones that became genuinely good insurance businesses.
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest InsurTech market report.
OUR METHODOLOGY
This analysis tests which InsurTech startups have found models that actually work based on the most recent financial and operating evidence available. We compare underwriting performance, profitability, loss trends, operating efficiency, customer or premium growth, capital structure and, where relevant, the durability of insurer and reinsurer support.
There is no single metric that settles the question. Revenue growth can coexist with poor underwriting, premium growth can be bought at uneconomic prices, and a large funding history says little about whether an insurance business can ultimately sustain itself. We therefore looked across several reporting periods whenever possible rather than allowing one unusually strong or weak quarter to determine the conclusion.
We adapted the test to each company's business model. A carrier retaining insurance risk can be assessed directly through loss ratios, combined ratios and profitability. An MGA, reciprocal manager or distribution platform puts more weight on carrier relationships, the quality of the underlying insurance book and whether its own fee economics can support the company.
For cyber insurance, we also examined whether the technology appears to affect risk and claims directly. That is important for companies such as Coalition and At-Bay because their economic case depends partly on security software improving risk selection, detecting problems during the policy period or reducing the severity of incidents.
We separated company success from validation of the original startup thesis. When a company became economically stronger only after materially changing its product mix, geography, risk exposure or capital structure, we treated that change as part of the answer. Hippo's diversification and ManyPets' retreat from the US are examples.
Acquisitions are treated similarly. A major insurer buying an InsurTech can provide strong strategic validation, but it does not automatically prove that the startup had reached standalone profitability. That distinction is particularly important for NEXT Insurance and At-Bay.
We gave the greatest weight to reported financial results, regulatory filings, insurer disclosures and measurable operating outcomes. Company-reported metrics were used where they provided the clearest direct evidence, especially for private companies, but confidence is naturally higher for listed insurers that publish fuller financial statements.
The sector funding figures provide context rather than a success metric. They are used to show how dramatically the financing environment changed after 2021 and why companies increasingly had to demonstrate underwriting discipline and operating leverage rather than relying on continued external capital.
Key sources used for this analysis include Gallagher Re's Global InsurTech Report for Q4 2025, Gallagher Re's Global InsurTech Report for Q4 2024, Root's Q2 2026 Form 10-Q, Root's Q2 2026 shareholder letter, Oscar Health's Q2 2026 financial results, Kin's Q2 2026 results, Hippo's Q2 2026 earnings release, and Lemonade's Q2 2026 shareholder letter.
For the private and acquired companies, important sources include Many Group's 2025 annual report, Alan's Q2 2026 letter to shareholders, Munich Re's NEXT Insurance acquisition presentation, Coalition's 2026 Cyber Claims Report, Coalition and Allianz Commercial's expanded cyber partnership announcement, Munich Re's announcement of the At-Bay acquisition, Pie Insurance's 2025 year in review, and wefox's financing and strategy announcement.
Our final judgments come from aggregating that evidence around one practical test: has the technology translated into demonstrably better insurance economics, and is there enough operating history to believe those economics can persist?
Who's the most efficient player in this market? Find out in our InsurTech market report.
