SpaceTech: what are the biggest challenges now?
In our space economy deck, you will find everything you need to understand the market
SUMMARY
SpaceTech’s biggest challenges now are commercial demand, concentration around a few dominant providers, and an orbital environment that is getting harder to manage as the industry scales.
Cheaper launch solved part of the access problem while creating a new structural one: much of the industry’s improved access to orbit now depends on a very small number of launch providers, with SpaceX operating at a cadence competitors still struggle to match.
The satellite boom is more concentrated than the headline numbers suggest. Telecommunications accounts for most new spacecraft, and Starlink alone represents such a large share of active satellites that total deployment no longer tells us much about how broad the commercial market really is.
Government demand remains one of SpaceTech’s hidden foundations. Launch, defence imagery, lunar transport, research, secure communications and future space stations still depend heavily on public customers even when the companies delivering them are privately owned.
Earth observation shows what happens when hardware becomes easier to deploy: the value moves up the stack. Owning satellites matters less when customers can choose among many images, while differentiated sensors, proprietary archives, fast tasking and automated analysis become much harder to replace.
Direct-to-phone satellite service stands out because the end-user hardware already exists at enormous scale. The strongest opportunity is not replacing terrestrial mobile networks, but extending them into places where towers are uneconomic, unavailable or temporarily down.
Orbit is becoming an operating constraint rather than a distant policy issue. Debris, conjunction management, disposal rules and the absence of a true global traffic authority are starting to affect how constellations are designed and operated.
Space infrastructure is also becoming strategically exposed. GNSS jamming, cyber risk and dependence on a few networks are pushing governments toward redundancy, sovereign launch, alternative communications and larger numbers of smaller satellites.
Several of SpaceTech’s most ambitious markets are now technically credible before they are commercially proven. Lunar delivery and private stations can be built and flown, but the harder question is whether enough non-government customers will pay for them repeatedly.
The industry can therefore keep growing very quickly without becoming broadly self-sustaining. The next phase of SpaceTech will be decided less by whether companies can put hardware in orbit and more by whether they can build durable demand, credible alternatives and workable rules around that hardware.
This market map, featured in our space economy deck, highlights top companies and startups in the space economy
Why are SpaceTech’s biggest problems showing up now?
SpaceTech’s biggest problems are becoming harder to ignore because the industry is scaling so quickly that weaknesses which once looked theoretical are starting to affect real operations and real businesses.
The latest OECD assessment puts the number of operational satellites at almost 15,000 by mid-2026. That is roughly double the level reached only a few years earlier. In 2025 alone, 329 launches put around 4,900 objects into space. Private operators have become the dominant force behind that expansion.
But the headline growth hides something important. Telecommunications satellites accounted for about 82% of satellites launched in 2025, while Starlink alone represented roughly 60% of all active satellites. The industry is growing extremely fast, but the growth is concentrated around a small number of huge networks rather than hundreds of equally successful space markets.
Money has come back too. The OECD estimates that private space investment reached roughly $11–13 billion in 2025, its strongest level since the 2021 peak, while government spending remains enormous.
So SpaceTech no longer has a simple “can we build it?” problem. These days, the harder questions are whether enough customers exist, whether competitors can survive against companies with huge scale advantages, and whether orbit itself can absorb what companies want to put there.
Has cheap launch fixed the SpaceTech launch problem, or just made SpaceX more dominant?
Cheap launch has made space much easier to reach, but SpaceTech is still heavily dependent on a tiny number of proven launch providers, and SpaceX’s lead is now as much about cadence as rocket technology.
The contrast is pretty stark. The United States carried out around 55% of orbital launches in 2025 but delivered approximately 87% of objects launched worldwide, according to the OECD. SpaceX explains most of that gap. SpaceX alone performed around half of global orbital launches, while SpaceX, China’s CASC, Rocket Lab and Roscosmos together handled more than four-fifths.
Only 12 countries had independently demonstrated orbital-launch capability by mid-2026. More countries are building launch sites or rockets, but having a programme on paper is very different from having a rocket customers can book regularly.
SpaceX’s experience shows how wide that gap has become. By early 2026, the company had completed more than 600 Falcon 9 booster recoveries. Some boosters had flown many missions, while many aspiring launch competitors were still trying to reach consistent orbital operations.
That operating rhythm changes the economics. A launcher flying two or three times a year spreads fixed costs very differently from one flying every week. Higher cadence also improves supplier pricing, gives teams more flight experience and makes scheduling easier for customers. Reusability amplifies those advantages once a company proves that refurbished hardware can keep flying reliably.
Rocket Lab has taken a more realistic route than trying to beat Falcon 9 directly on cost per kilogram. Electron can charge for dedicated launches, particular orbits and schedule control, while Neutron gives the company a route into larger missions. Europe has another reason to stay in launch: Ariane 6 does not need to be the cheapest rocket in the world for independent European access to remain strategically valuable.
Rideshare has undeniably transformed SpaceTech. Small satellite companies can reach orbit far more cheaply and frequently than a decade ago. The catch is that much of that convenience depends on the same dominant infrastructure.
| Launch signal | What it tells us |
|---|---|
| Around 329 launches in 2025 | Access to orbit is expanding quickly |
| SpaceX around half of global launches | Effective launch supply remains highly concentrated |
| Four operators above 80% combined | The number of rocket companies exaggerates real competition |
| 12 countries with independent orbital capability | Sovereign access to orbit is still rare |
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest space economy report.
As this chart shows, and as featured in our space economy deck, search interest in the space economy has been rising steadily
Is SpaceTech building satellites faster than it is finding customers?
In parts of SpaceTech, yes: satellite deployment is growing much faster than the number of proven commercial markets that can support all that infrastructure.
Almost 15,000 operational satellites were already in orbit by mid-2026, but that number can easily give the wrong impression. Telecommunications made up roughly 82% of 2025 satellite launches. Starlink alone represented around 60% of active spacecraft. The satellite boom therefore does not mean thousands of independent customers are suddenly buying thousands of different space services.
This creates a tougher market for suppliers. A company selling propulsion systems, antennas or satellite components might see huge spacecraft forecasts and assume that its accessible market is exploding. Yet vertically integrated constellations can manufacture key hardware themselves, buy at enormous scale or lock suppliers into a handful of giant programmes.
At the same time, several newer SpaceTech markets are building expensive infrastructure ahead of proven demand. Commercial space stations, orbital manufacturing, lunar transport and servicing are obvious examples. Companies can demonstrate that the hardware works before they demonstrate that enough customers will pay for it repeatedly.
Governments currently fill much of that gap. NASA buys commercial lunar deliveries, private astronaut services and low-Earth-orbit research capacity. Defence and intelligence agencies buy imagery, communications and launch services. Governments in Europe and Asia fund sovereign infrastructure for strategic reasons that go beyond commercial return.
A satellite launched proves that someone financed a satellite. It does not automatically prove that a durable end market exists.
Can SpaceTech companies make money without government contracts?
Some SpaceTech companies already can, but government customers still support a surprisingly large part of the industry, especially once we move away from consumer connectivity.
Satellite broadband has the clearest independent revenue base because it sells into an existing global telecom market. Earth-observation companies can also make money from agriculture, insurance, mapping and other commercial customers. Navigation services sit underneath huge parts of the wider economy.
The upstream side looks different. Governments remain major buyers of launch, defence imagery, secure communications, lunar transport, scientific payload delivery and human-spaceflight infrastructure. Even companies that describe themselves as commercial often depend on public contracts during the years when their markets are still small.
The pattern in private investment is revealing too. The OECD’s latest work shows strong investor attention around defence, intelligence, infrastructure and connectivity, exactly the areas where government demand can reduce the risk that a company builds something without a buyer.
Government procurement helped create aviation, semiconductors and the internet as well. The key test for SpaceTech is whether public demand eventually brings in enough other customers to stop carrying the market by itself.
This chart, featured in our space economy deck, illustrates yearly venture capital funding for space economy startups
Is Earth observation turning into a commodity?
Basic satellite imagery is getting harder to differentiate, while the valuable part of Earth observation is moving toward unique sensors, faster answers and software that tells customers what changed.
Planet is a good example of how far this market has come. For its fiscal year ending in early 2026, Planet reported record annual revenue of about $308 million, more than $900 million of backlog and positive annual free cash flow. Its remaining performance obligations rose to around $852 million, more than double the previous year.
Those figures show that Earth observation can produce repeat customers and substantial contracted revenue. But customers have much more imagery to choose from than they did when simply owning a satellite constellation was unusual.
Free government datasets remain widely available. Commercial optical providers increasingly overlap on resolution and revisit frequency. Another image of the same port or field is not necessarily worth much by itself.
Companies therefore have stronger positions when they own something harder to copy. ICEYE uses synthetic-aperture radar to see through clouds and darkness. Planet has an unusually deep archive of high-frequency global imagery. BlackSky focuses heavily on rapid tasking and intelligence. Analytics companies can turn images into alerts rather than making customers interpret raw pixels.
| Earth-observation product | Competitive position today |
|---|---|
| Standard optical imagery | Increasingly easy to substitute |
| Frequent revisits | Valuable, but competition is growing |
| SAR and other differentiated sensors | Harder to reproduce |
| Long proprietary data archives | More valuable as history accumulates |
| Automated analysis and alerts | Increasingly where customers see the real value |
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest space economy report.
Will direct-to-phone satellites become SpaceTech’s next huge market?
Direct-to-phone satellite service has one of the strongest demand cases in SpaceTech right now, although it looks much better as an extension of mobile networks than as a replacement for them.
The reason is simple: billions of people already own the terminal. Instead of persuading customers to buy a satellite phone or dish, operators can potentially connect ordinary smartphones.
Starlink says its satellite-to-mobile network already has around 650 satellites and works with mobile operators across six continents. Through those partners, it says the service could be accessible to more than 1.7 billion people. Messaging already works in supported markets, while broader data, voice and video capability is being expanded.
AST SpaceMobile is pursuing the same opportunity with a different architecture. It has relationships with close to 60 mobile operators representing more than 3 billion subscribers. The company estimates that roughly 45–60 BlueBird satellites could provide continuous service across selected major markets and around 90 could deliver broader global coverage.
There is still a physics problem. A normal phone has a tiny antenna and little transmission power. Each satellite also shares finite capacity across a massive area, while spectrum generally comes through terrestrial telecom partners and national regulators.
Dense cities already have much more terrestrial capacity than satellites can realistically match. Rural regions, oceans, disaster zones, wilderness and transport corridors are much more obvious targets. That is already enough to support a very large market.
This chart, featured in our space economy deck, shows why SpaceX is leading in the space economy
Is space debris now a real problem for SpaceTech companies?
Yes. Space debris has already moved from a future environmental concern to a real operating constraint for companies using low-Earth orbit.
ESA’s latest statistics count roughly 46,650 objects regularly tracked around Earth, compared with around 16,000 functioning satellites. Those catalogued objects are only the visible part of the problem. ESA models estimate more than 1.2 million debris objects larger than one centimetre, big enough to cause catastrophic damage at orbital speed.
Certain orbital bands are much more crowded than the global number suggests. Around 550 kilometres, ESA estimates that threatening debris objects are already present in roughly the same order of magnitude as active satellites.
Fragmentation keeps adding to the population. More than 660 breakups, explosions, collisions and other fragmentation events have been recorded since the beginning of the space age. Some debris can stay in orbit for decades or longer.
For constellation operators, the consequences are practical. Satellites need propulsion for avoidance manoeuvres. Teams need tracking and automated conjunction systems. Operators lose some fuel and operational time when spacecraft move. Regulators are also demanding faster disposal after missions end.
| Orbital environment | Approximate scale |
|---|---|
| Functioning satellites | 16,000 |
| Regularly tracked objects | 46,650 |
| Estimated debris above 1 cm | More than 1.2 million |
| Recorded fragmentation events | More than 660 |
| Total mass in Earth orbit | More than 17,000 tonnes |
Can SpaceTech manage traffic before low-Earth orbit gets too crowded?
SpaceTech can probably handle far more satellites technically, but today’s traffic rules are still too fragmented for the scale companies are proposing.
Tracking an approaching spacecraft is becoming easier. Companies and governments have better sensors, orbital data and automated collision-avoidance software. The awkward part comes when two manoeuvrable satellites from different operators need to decide who moves.
There is no global equivalent of air-traffic control for orbit. Operators share information through several systems and bilateral arrangements, but there is no single authority telling every spacecraft what to do.
The number of participants is growing quickly. According to the OECD, 109 countries had placed at least one satellite into orbit by the end of 2025. Nearly 60 countries had introduced some form of national space regulation. Meanwhile, private operators are responsible for most new spacecraft.
As seen above, debris makes that coordination problem more urgent. Better collision software can reduce risk, but it cannot decide international liability, force operators to share accurate orbital data or create universally accepted right-of-way rules.
This chart, featured in our space economy deck, illustrates yearly funding for space economy startups
Are satellites becoming dangerously easy targets?
Space infrastructure is becoming more exposed because satellites now support services important enough for governments and militaries to disrupt deliberately.
Navigation is the clearest example. ICAO, the International Telecommunication Union and the International Maritime Organization have all warned about growing GNSS jamming and spoofing. Aviation authorities are developing specific procedures for aircraft operating when satellite navigation becomes unreliable.
This is already happening in practice. ICAO has formally addressed recurring interference affecting routes around the Korean Peninsula and has also dealt with repeated GNSS disruption linked to Russian territory.
Communications satellites face similar risks. Ground terminals can be jammed or attacked. Cyber intrusions can target control systems. Satellites themselves are difficult to repair once something goes wrong.
The stakes have risen because space systems are deeply woven into ordinary infrastructure. The OECD estimates that satellite-enabled systems support more than half of the most critical infrastructure and services across member countries, covering areas such as transport, telecommunications, energy and food systems.
Governments are responding with larger numbers of smaller satellites, redundant networks, multiple communication paths and launch capacity that can replace lost spacecraft more quickly.
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest space economy report.
Can SpaceTech really mass-produce satellites without reliability falling apart?
SpaceTech is getting much better at building satellites in volume, but producing hundreds of spacecraft quickly while keeping failure rates low remains a difficult industrial problem.
Traditional satellites were closer to handcrafted machines. Constellations need repeatable production lines, standardized components, automated tests and suppliers capable of delivering hardware continuously.
The challenge is unforgiving because a defective satellite cannot return to the factory. Even a relatively cheap component can ruin a multimillion-dollar spacecraft after launch.
Mass production also creates correlated risk. If 200 satellites share the same battery, thruster or computer and that design contains a hidden defect, one engineering mistake can affect an entire generation of spacecraft.
Companies are nevertheless showing that much higher production rates are possible. Planet launched 40 satellites in its latest fiscal year while running an established commercial business. AST SpaceMobile is building much larger spacecraft and wants to move toward a regular launch rhythm as it expands its constellation.
Once production reaches that scale, yield, supplier reliability, test automation and replacement speed matter almost as much as the original spacecraft design.
This chart, featured in our space economy deck, compares the main business model options for Earth observation satellite operators
Is regulation still slowing SpaceTech down?
Regulation still slows SpaceTech in some places, but inconsistent rules across countries are increasingly more frustrating than the existence of rules themselves.
A satellite operator may need launch authorization, spectrum rights, remote-sensing permission, debris compliance and export approval before the spacecraft even starts providing a service. A satellite-to-phone company then has to work with telecom regulators and mobile operators market by market.
The United States has simplified part of the launch process. The FAA moved legacy commercial launch activities onto its Part 450 system in 2026. One licence can cover multiple vehicle configurations, mission profiles and even different launch or re-entry sites. SpaceX, Rocket Lab, Firefly, Blue Origin and United Launch Alliance were among the operators that transitioned.
Around 60 countries now have some form of space regulation, roughly 50% more than a decade ago according to the OECD. More regulation can help companies when it makes responsibilities clear. Problems appear when companies have to redesign compliance processes every time they enter another market.
Direct-to-device satellite services show this particularly clearly. The spacecraft is global, but spectrum and telecom rights are still mostly national.
Is SpaceTech still too expensive for venture capital?
A lot of SpaceTech remains awkwardly expensive for venture capital because hardware companies can burn huge amounts of money years before the market tells investors whether the product works.
Private space investment recovered to roughly $11–13 billion in 2025 according to the OECD, the strongest level since 2021. Investors clearly have not abandoned the sector.
But the money increasingly favors companies with strong strategic demand, later-stage businesses and markets where governments or large commercial customers can pay substantial contracts. Funding a speculative rocket, station or lunar infrastructure company is a much harder proposition.
Vast shows the scale involved. In 2026, the company announced another $500 million of financing for its space-station programme, split between $300 million in equity and $200 million in debt. By then, more than $1 billion had already been invested into its technology and facilities. Haven-1 is targeted for launch in 2027.
A software startup can often launch something imperfect, learn from customers and change direction. Space hardware companies may spend several years reaching one decisive flight test, and a failure can mean another year of spending before the next attempt.
Virgin Orbit’s bankruptcy and Astra’s difficult public-market history already showed how quickly the financing model breaks when operational progress falls behind capital needs.
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest space economy report.
This chart, featured in our space economy deck, shows revenue breakdown by customer segment in the space economy
Is the commercial Moon actually becoming a real business?
Commercial lunar transport is becoming real, but the broader Moon economy still depends overwhelmingly on governments paying companies to go there.
NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services programme has created an actual private delivery market. Firefly’s Blue Ghost successfully landed 10 NASA payloads on the Moon in 2025. Intuitive Machines has carried NASA payloads on multiple lunar missions. Astrobotic, Firefly and Intuitive Machines are all receiving additional work.
And the contracts are getting meaningful. NASA awarded Intuitive Machines $180.4 million for one new lunar delivery and Firefly $176.7 million for another. More recently, NASA awarded almost $600 million across Astrobotic, Firefly and Intuitive Machines for four additional deliveries connected to its Moon Base plans.
That is real revenue, repeated missions and multiple competing suppliers.
The weak point is the identity of the customer. NASA still sits underneath much of the demand. Other space agencies and government-backed exploration programmes make up another important share. Private payloads exist, but we have not yet seen anything close to enough independent commercial spending to support a large lunar logistics industry by itself.
Reliability is still improving too. Astrobotic’s Peregrine failed before reaching the lunar surface. Intuitive Machines successfully reached the Moon but had complications during its early landings. Firefly’s Blue Ghost gave the sector a much cleaner demonstration that commercial lunar delivery can work end to end.
The Moon has crossed the transportation threshold. The harder step is finding enough customers who want to buy those deliveries without NASA paying most of the bill.
Can private space stations find enough customers after the ISS?
Private space stations can probably be built, but we still do not really know whether enough customers will pay orbital prices to keep several stations busy.
NASA wants commercial operators to take over part of the low-Earth-orbit role currently served by the International Space Station. Axiom Space, Vast, Starlab and teams involved with Orbital Reef have all been working toward that market.
Vast is pushing particularly hard. The company has raised more than $1 billion, completed an orbital demonstration mission and is integrating Haven-1 for a planned 2027 launch. Its longer-term plan is to move from Haven-1 toward the larger Haven-2 station.
Demand is less settled. NASA will remain a major research customer, while national astronaut missions can bring additional revenue. Axiom has already organized private astronaut missions to the ISS, and NASA has selected it for another mission targeted for 2027.
The commercial case beyond governments is still much less proven. Tourism can support some seats but probably cannot carry an entire station ecosystem. Pharmaceutical research and in-space manufacturing could become valuable, although companies still need to prove that microgravity creates enough economic value to cover launch, crew and station costs repeatedly.
Once the ISS disappears, the real test will be whether customers have enough valuable work to keep paying for another flight.
This chart, featured in our space economy deck, shows how satellite internet platform technology has evolved over time
Is SpaceTech becoming too dependent on a handful of companies?
Yes. Some of the most important parts of SpaceTech are becoming more concentrated even while the total number of space companies keeps growing.
Starlink accounted for around 60% of active satellites in 2025. SpaceX performed roughly half of global orbital launches. US operators controlled about 76% of active satellites, largely because of broadband constellations. Four organizations handled more than 80% of orbital launches.
Those numbers are hard to dismiss as normal market leadership.
There are good reasons for the concentration. SpaceX’s vertical integration lets one company manufacture satellites, build terminals, operate a broadband service and provide its own launch capacity. That lowers costs and makes extremely fast deployment possible.
The problem appears when governments, satellite companies or customers cannot easily switch providers.
We can already see the reaction. Europe continues funding sovereign launch capacity and its own secure communications infrastructure. Amazon is building a large competing low-Earth-orbit broadband network. Governments increasingly buy imagery from several providers rather than relying on one. Defence agencies are spreading critical capabilities across larger constellations.
A competitor does not always need to beat the dominant company on price. Being a credible second supplier can itself become valuable.
Will geopolitical competition make SpaceTech bigger or more fragmented?
Geopolitical competition is pouring money into SpaceTech while also breaking the market into more national and regional systems.
Defence spending explains much of the acceleration. The OECD estimates that military programmes represented about 46% of US government space spending in 2025. Japan’s defence-related space spending increased almost sevenfold between 2022 and 2025. Germany, meanwhile, has laid out plans for tens of billions of euros of space-related defence investment through the end of the decade.
That creates direct demand for secure communications, missile warning, Earth observation, positioning, launch and space-domain awareness.
It also encourages duplication. Europe wants launchers and communications networks it can control. China is building its own large constellations. Governments increasingly worry about depending on foreign navigation, imagery or communications systems during a crisis.
Export controls fragment the market further. Satellite components, high-performance chips, sensors and propulsion systems can fall under strict technology controls, while governments scrutinize foreign investment in strategically sensitive companies.
So geopolitics is making SpaceTech bigger without necessarily making it more global. Some of the fastest-growing opportunities now exist precisely because countries want less dependence on each other.
In our space economy deck, we identify pain points entrepreneurs should prioritize
So what are SpaceTech’s biggest challenges now?
SpaceTech’s biggest challenge today is making the industry around the technology work as well as the technology itself.
The numbers make that increasingly clear. Almost 15,000 operational satellites are already in orbit. Around 4,900 objects were launched in a single year. Private investment has recovered. Commercial lunar landers have reached the Moon. Satellite-to-phone networks are already operating. Private stations are moving toward flight hardware.
Yet much of that progress rests on a surprisingly narrow foundation.
One company still accounts for around half of global launches and roughly 60% of active satellites through Starlink. Telecommunications dominates new satellite deployment. Governments remain anchor customers for launch, imagery, lunar delivery, defence infrastructure and future space stations. Meanwhile, ESA tracks around 46,650 objects in orbit and estimates more than 1.2 million dangerous debris fragments larger than one centimetre.
The three hardest problems are becoming quite clear. SpaceTech needs enough paying demand to justify all the infrastructure being built, credible alternatives to a few dominant providers, and workable rules for an orbital environment containing thousands more spacecraft.
Commercial demand is the biggest economic test. Orbital congestion is the biggest shared physical problem. Concentration is the biggest strategic weakness.
If SpaceTech makes real progress on those three fronts, cheaper rockets and better satellites can support a much larger economy. Otherwise, the industry can keep growing extremely fast while remaining heavily dependent on governments, dominant infrastructure providers and increasingly crowded orbits.
That is where the SpaceTech race currently stands.
If you want more recent data on this point, please see our latest space economy report.
OUR METHODOLOGY
The main question behind this analysis is SpaceTech: what are the biggest challenges now? Because the answer is broad and easy to reduce to intuition or industry hype, we broke it into commercial, operational, industrial, regulatory and strategic dimensions, then assessed each one separately before bringing the findings back together.
For each dimension, we prioritized fresh evidence from public agencies, regulators, company disclosures and major institutional datasets. We generally gave more weight to what is already happening in practice: operating activity over announced capacity, recurring contracts over projected demand, actual market concentration over the number of nominal competitors, and observed infrastructure constraints over long-range forecasts.
We then aggregated the evidence point by point. A challenge ranked higher when it appeared across several parts of SpaceTech, affected decisions being made today, and looked difficult for normal technological progress alone to solve. That is how we moved from a long list of industry problems to the three issues that recur most consistently across the article: commercial demand, concentration and orbital congestion.
Key sources used for this analysis include the OECD Space Economy at a Glance 2026 and its sections on market concentration and value creation and strategic capabilities and competitiveness; ESA’s debris statistics and Space Environment Report; the FAA on Part 450 licensing; Planet’s financial results; Starlink Direct to Cell; AST SpaceMobile; the IMO, ICAO and ITU joint statement on satellite interference; ICAO on GNSS interference; NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services programme and commercial LEO destinations strategy; Vast on Haven financing and development; ESA on autonomous European launch access; and Rocket Lab on Electron’s dedicated-launch model.
This chart, featured in our space economy deck, shows revenue breakdown by region across Europe, Asia, North America, Africa, and South America in the space economy
Related blog posts
- SpaceTech: what are startups building now?
- SpaceTech: what’s changing now?
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- The most recent funding news in the space economy
